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One of the clearest findings of empirical political science is that the prospects of 
sustaining democratic government in a poor society are far lower than in a 
relatively wealthy one.  Precisely why poverty undermines democracy, however, 
has been much less clear.  In order to answer this question, we use data from 
seven 1999-20Afrobarometer surveys in Southern Africa to develop measures of 
poverty and well-being, as well as its possible consequences both in terms of 
day-to-day survival and political attitudes and behaviour.  The data yield the 
following conclusions. 
 
Firstly, it is possible to isolate and measure a multifaceted but unidimensional 
Index of Lived Poverty that taps peoples’ ability to obtain the basic necessities of 
life.  This measure forms one part of overall well-being and is empirically 
distinct from, though related to, other factors such as health or access to state 
services.  In contrast to recent efforts to broaden the concept of poverty, well 
being in Southern Africa is multi-dimensional and cannot be reduced to a single 
composite measure that combines the ability to secure basic necessities with 
things such as employment, access to public services and health status.  
 
Secondly, our measure of lived poverty consists of several short 
subjective/perceptual items placed on relatively small sample surveys.  Yet it 
obtains virtually the same cross national and cross provincial results as 
measures, generally preferred by economists, that are based either on national 
account data (GNP per capita) or on massive and intrusive household surveys of 
household income, expenditure, infrastructure and circumstances).  The cost of 
such surveys usually means that they are undertaken relatively infrequently in 
developing countries.  In contrast, the Lived Poverty Index can be used more 
frequently on surveys of relatively small samples.  This enables policy makers to 
track reliably national and sub-national trends in the overall extent of lived 
poverty or of its subcomponents such as hunger.  And because it is relatively 
                                                     
1 An earlier version of this paper entitled ‘Going Without In Southern Africa’ was 
presented to the United Kingdom Department for International Development (South Africa) 
Poverty Workshop on ‘Measuring and Assessing Poverty’ (Shere View Lodge, Pretoria, 13 
March 2000). 
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short in length, the Index can be placed on several different types of surveys to 
allow poverty researchers to examine linkages of poverty and other elements of 
well-being, such as various types of economic, social and political behaviour.   
 
Thirdly, not only do we find quite extensive levels of lived poverty in Southern 
Africa, we also find that social capital networks (in the form of survival 
strategies) are quite limited.  Most people can rely on just one strategy to obtain 
basic necessities such as food, home security, cash or health care.  While only 
small proportions can be considered to be ‘helpless’ in that they have no primary 
survival strategy, large proportions are ‘vulnerable’ to external shocks in that 
they have no backup strategies in case their primary ones fail.   
 
Fourthly, an examination of specific survival strategies reveals the extremely 
limited reach of the state across the region.  With the exception of health care, 
few Southern Africans think of government as either a primary or backup source 
of food, cash or most astonishingly, home security.   
 
Fifthly, Southern Africans use a variety of strategies to get by on a daily basis.  
A single indicator such as interpersonal trust or participation in community 
organisations cannot neatly summarize this type of social capital.   
 
Finally, the Afrobarometer contains the unusual combination in the same survey 
of both measures of lived poverty and measures of political values and 
behaviours.  In contrast to popular wisdom, we find that, net other correlates 
such as education and political efficacy, poverty has little observable impact on 
political values and behaviours.  If anything, poverty is associated with 
increased levels of some forms of political participation.  
 
This suggests that the well-established relationship of national wealth and 
democratic endurance is not a result of micro-level dynamics (e.g. that poor 
people are less democratic than workers or middle class folk).  Rather, it simply 
may be that poor countries are less able to afford or maintain the things vital to 
sustainable democracy, ranging from formal state institutions such as quality 
electoral machinery and a well-resourced legislature, to societal institutions such 
as effective political parties, an independent news media, and a vibrant web of 





One of the clearest findings of empirical political science is that the prospects of 
sustaining democratic government in a poor society are far lower than in a 
relatively wealthy one (Lipset, 1959: 69-105; Bollen and Jackman, 1989: 438-
457; Przewroski et al, 2000).  Given Africa’s widespread poverty, this is a 
sobering thought for all those committed to democracy on this continent.   
 
Precisely why poverty undermines democracy, however, has been much less 
clear.  It may be that poor people simply have far less time to devote to the types 
of participation that give life to democracy.  Alternatively, it could be that poor 
people, given the imperative to satisfy a range of basic survival needs, have little 
reason to worry about satisfying ‘higher order’ needs like self-government, 
freedom and equality that democracy fulfils.  Or, poverty may prevent people 
from taking part in processes that produce shifts in values necessary for stable 
democracy: processes such as education, urbanization, or using the mass media.  
In short, poverty inhibits the modernisation that breeds democratic values 
(Inglehart, 2000; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Welzel et al, n.d.).  Finally, others 
have pointed out that poorer societies are less able to distribute wealth equitably 
or facilitate accommodation and compromise in clashes over resources 
(Huntington, 1991: 59-72).   
 
In order to understand better the shape of poverty in Africa and its links with 
democracy, this Afrobarometer Working Paper examines responses from a 
common set of questions asked in Afrobarometer surveys in seven Southern 
African countries between September 1999 and August 2000.  These responses 
help us describe the extent, depth and structural characteristics of poverty in 
Southern Africa, the strategies that ordinary people use to overcome poverty, 
and the consequences of poverty for citizen willingness to support, participate 
in, and defend democracy.  The Afrobarometer is a systematic survey of 
ordinary Africans’ views toward democracy, economics and civil society, 
conducted in countries that have introduced a degree of democratic and 
economic reform.  Because the instrument asks a standard set of questions, 
countries can be systematically compared.  While the first round of the 
Afrobarometer was based on surveys in twelve countries, this paper focuses on 
responses to a specific set of questions on various elements of well-being that 
were contained in seven Southern African surveys (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe).2  Each survey was based on a 
                                                     
2  Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Uganda and Tanzania are the other countries that comprise 
the Afrobarometer.  However, the questionnaires used in those countries did not contain the 
full set of questions covered in this paper. 
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random, stratified, nationally representative sample and conducted between July 
1999 and July 2000.  Trained enumerators conducted face-to-face interviews in 
local languages with a total of 9 368 respondents in the seven countries.  With 
sample sizes of 1 200, responses based on the national sample are subject to a 
margin of sampling error of +/- 3 percentage points at a 95 percent level of 
confidence (South Africa had a sample size of 2,200 and a margin of error of +/- 





Poverty is normally described using data from national censuses or dedicated 
surveys of relatively large samples of households using extensive questionnaires 
devoted to assessing household income, expenditure and assets.  In either case, 
the task requires a substantial number of questions and questionnaire space.4  
When designing the first round of Afrobarometer surveys, the national research 
partners clearly understood that poverty was a potential major obstacle to 
consolidating democracy in Africa, but they also knew that the greater portion of 
the questionnaire would be devoted to measuring citizen support for democratic 
and economic reform.   
 
Thus we attempted to design a limited number of questions that could assess 
poverty and well being without having to do a detailed mapping of household 
income, expenditure, consumption or assets.  These questions simply asked 
respondents approximately how often in the past year they or their family had to 
‘go without’ certain specified of basic necessities.  We also posed a series of 
standard questions about the respondents’ educational attainment, employment 
status, occupation, household access to services, and enjoyment of basic 
                                                     
3  Actual sample sizes for each country are as follows: Botswana = 1200, Lesotho = 
1177, Malawi = 1208, Namibia = 1183, South Africa = 2200, Zambia = 1200, and Zimbabwe 
= 1200.  National research institutions affiliated with the Afrobarometer project conducted 
fieldwork. Samples were designed using a common, multi-stage, stratified, area cluster 
approach.  Random selection methods were used at each stage, with probability proportional 
to population size where appropriate.  Sampling frames were constructed in the first stages 
from the most up-to-date census figures or projections available, and thereafter from census 
maps, systematic walk patterns, and project-generated lists of household members.  With the 
exception of South Africa, each country samples was self-weighted and sufficiently 
representative of national characteristics on key socio-economic indicators (gender, age, and 
region) that post-weighting was not necessary. 
4  For example, Statistics South Africa’s 1995 Income and Expenditure Survey (which 
operated in tandem with its October Household Survey) in just the section on consumption 
contained 27 question on the cost of housing, 131 questions on monthly expenditures on food 
and beverages, and 22 questions on food consumed from own production.  See Harold 
Alderman et al, 2000: 9.   
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necessities of life.  Finally, Afrobarometer interviewers made a range of 
observations of the conditions on the household and immediate surrounding 
community (in the language of sampling methodology, the primary sampling 
unit, or in terms of census based maps, enumerator areas).  These totalled 23 
interviewer observed items and 13 questions posed directly to the respondent. 5 
 
 
The Dimensionality of Well-Being 
 
Not satisfied with focussing solely on money metric measures, poverty 
researchers in developing countries have over the past decade attempted to 
broaden the concept of poverty into a more multi-faceted definition that includes 
many aspects of well-being and inequality that better reflects the lived 
experiences of people, especially the poor.   Perhaps the zenith of this trend can 
be found in the definition used by the 1995 World Summit on Social 
Development in Copenhagen.   
 
‘Poverty has various manifestations, including lack of income and 
productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods; 
hunger and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access to 
education and other basic services; increased morbidity and mortality 
from illnesses; homelessness and inadequate housing; unsafe 
environments and social discrimination and exclusion.  It is also 
characterised by a lack of participation in decision-making and in 
civil, social and cultural life … Absolute poverty is a condition 
characterised by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including 
food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, 
education and information.  It depends not only on income but also on 
access to services’. 
 
Accordingly, researchers have attempted to build various, larger indices that add 
to or substitute for income data on things such as life expectancy, caloric intake, 
height and weight, formal education, literacy, employment, quality of housing, 
access to services.  Others have resorted to more qualitative indicators of 
feelings of powerlessness and exclusion.  
 
Thus we first ask whether there is a single underlying dimension running 
through these 36 separate measures that we can use as a single, though 
multifaceted measure of ‘poverty’?  In order to test this we used statistical tests 
                                                     
5   For his valuable help in designing all the key question items reviewed in this paper, 
we owe a special debt of thanks to George Ellison. 
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known as Factor Analysis and Reliability Analysis.6  In other words, we wanted 
to know whether those individuals who are impoverished on one item tend to be 
equally impoverished across all other items?   
 
In fact, we found six separate, though related, underlying dimensions in the 
responses to these items.  Two dimensions are reflected largely by items 
measuring individual responses to questions about well being.  The first, and for 
our purposes most important dimension is reflected by seven items that ask 
people how often they ‘go without’ basic necessities: a cash income, food, 
medical treatment, home fuel, water, electricity and home safety.7  We interpret 
this scale as a composite measure of lived poverty.  Our ability to extract a 
single valid and reliable dimension from these items means that people who 
have difficulty obtaining one type of basic necessity tend to be those who have 
difficulties obtaining all the others.  While home safety is the item most weakly 
correlated with the underlying dimension, it is still sufficiently associated with it 
and illustrates that poverty is characterised by a lack of security, whether it be 
physical, or physiological.   
 
A second dimension of well being is tapped by two items that measure physical 
and mental ill health.8  The fact that these items do not ‘load’ on the poverty 
dimension illustrates that ill health, while strongly related to poverty is not 
simply reducible to a trait of poverty.   
 
Four other separate dimensions were tapped by question items measuring 
fieldworker observations of the primary sampling area, or immediate community 
around the household.  One dimension is tapped by eight items that measure 
various aspects of development infrastructure.  For the most part, it is comprised 
of infrastructure that can only be provided by government.9  A second dimension 
                                                     
6  We ultimately used 35 items; the question measuring occupation was omitted since 
it is a categorical variable and hence not suitable for this type of test. 
7  The scale was confirmed verified through statistical procedures known as Factor 
Analysis (using Maximum Likelihood extraction and Direct Oblimin rotation) and Reliability 
Analysis.  From these items, it is possible to extract a single unrotated factor with an 
Eigenvalue of 2.89 that explains 41.2 percent of the common variance.  The items load on, or 
correlate with the underlying factor as follows: cash income (.71), food (.66), medical 
treatment (.61), home fuel (.55) water (.50), electricity (.50), and home safety (.35).  The scale 
is reliable (Kronbach’s Alpha = . 75). 
8  Factor analysis demonstrated that the items could not be combined with any others 
to create one single scale.  The two items are highly correlated (Pearson’s r = .61) and form a 
very reliable two item construct (Kronbach’s Alpha = .75). 
9  From these items it is possible to extract a single unrotated factor with an 
Eigenvalue of 4.35 that explains 54.4 percent of the variance common to all eight items.  The 
reliability (Kronbach’s Alpha) = .86.  The items load on the factor as follows: household 
access to electricity (.77), household access to piper water (.76), community access to 
sewerage (.76), community access to an electricity grid (.75), community access to a piped 
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is tapped by twelve question items measuring various aspects of community 
services.  It includes a mixture of things that can be provided by both local 
communities and government.10  A third dimension is tapped by three items that 
measures the extent of agricultural activity.11  Finally, a fourth, separate 
dimension is tapped by two items that measure access to schools.12 
 
These six dimensions represent empirically distinct indicators of development 
and well-being.  Each of these sets of indicators was then aggregated and 
averaged to create an index score for each respondent in the survey as well as 
for each country.  Finally, it is also important to note that individual items 
measuring educational attainment, employment and quality of housing do not 
cluster with any of these broader indices.   We now discuss national results on 
each dimension in detail. 
 
 
Lived Poverty  
 
As already mentioned, poverty has traditionally been assessed through intensive 
surveys of relatively large household samples that measure cash income, 
expenditure and assets.  In most African societies, however, this requires 
extensive questioning about transactions or possessions involving a range of 
money and non-money metric goods and services, and then converting the non- 
money metric goods into money terms.   The Afrobarometer questionnaire 
simply had no space for this type of questioning.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
water scheme (.72), the extent of formal houses in a community (.71), the quality of the 
respondent’s house (.54), and pavement alongside roads in the community (.49). 
10  From these items, it was possible to obtain a single, rotated factors with an 
Eigenvalue of 4.4.3 that measures 36.9 percent of the common variance of all 12 items.  The 
reliability (Kronbach’s Alpha) = .84.  The items load onto the factor as follows: petrol station 
(.70), police station (.69), post office (.68), grocery or clothing stores (.64), meeting halls 
(.60), health clinics (.56), market stalls (.52), police on the streets (.45), bus/taxi service (.45), 
small shops (.41), recreation facilities (.39), and places of worship (.34).  The same tests were 
used to confirm that additional items could not be added into this scale without either creating 
more than one underlying dimension, or appreciably weakening the validity and reliability of 
the factor. 
11  From these items, a single unrotated factor can be extracted with an Eigenvalue of 
1.95 that explains 65.0 percent of the common variance.  Reliability (Kronbach’s Alpha = 
.73).  The strongest item loading onto the fact is community livestock production (.78), 
community crop production (.68) and the existence of tall trees in the community (.61).   
12  Factor analysis demonstrated that these items could not be combined with any other 
items to form a larger scale.  The two items are correlated (Pearson’s r = .33) and the two item 
construct is very reliable (Kronbach’s Alpha = .92). 
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In addition, we suspected that we could more effectively ask about what we call 
‘lived poverty’.  That is, while a lack of money, assets or access to services may 
prevent people from securing the basic necessities of life, what really matters is 
whether or not people do, in fact, secure these basic necessities.  Thus, we felt 
we could more effectively borrow from an approach first pioneered in the New 
Democracies Barometer surveys in Central and Eastern Europe by Richard Rose 
(1998). In order to measure poverty, we presented survey respondents with a list 
of basic necessities and asked: ‘In the last twelve months, how often have you or 
your family gone without (these things): Was it often, sometimes, rarely or 
never?’  We asked about food, water, home safety, medical treatment, a cash 
income, home fuel and electricity.  If Amartya Sen (1995) is right and the value 
of one’s standard of living lies in the living itself, we believe that people’s 
answers to how often they go without basic necessities, rather than how much 
money they make, or what they have in their home, offers us a valid, reliable 
and direct measure of poverty.   The responses to these questions also paint a 
sobering picture of poverty across Southern Africa as of 1999-2000. 
 
Food  
The responses reveal that hunger was already a significant problem in Southern 
Africa in 1999-2000, particularly in Lesotho.  The average (median) respondents 
in Lesotho, Zambia and Namibia say that they or their families had ‘sometimes’ 
‘gone without enough food to eat’ in the previous twelve months.13  Just less 
than one half of all Basotho aged 18 and over (46 percent) said they did so 
‘often’.  When added to the 14 percent who said they ‘sometimes’ went without, 
we see a staggering, depressing picture of food insecurity in the mountain 
kingdom.  The median respondents in Malawi, Zimbabwe and South Africa said 
they ‘rarely’ went without.  Only in Botswana is the median response ‘never’ to 
go without.  Black South Africans paralleled Malawians and Zimbabweans with 
the average response ‘rarely’ to go without food, while white, coloured and 
Indians tended ‘never’ to do without. (See Table 1).   
 
Water  
As of 1999-2000, water deprivation was on average worst in Zambia where the 
median respondent fell between saying they ‘sometime’ or ‘rarely’ went without 
‘enough clear water to drink and cook with’.  Elsewhere the average respondent 
‘rarely’ went without potable water, except in Botswana and South Africa where 
the central tendency was ‘never’ to go without.  However, it should be noted that 
one third of Basotho (34 percent) said they ‘often’ went without enough clean 
water to drink or cook with in the previous twelve months.  Ironically, Lesotho’s 
                                                     
13  The median is the value or response category where we find the case that divides 
the sample into two equal halves: for ordinal response scales such as the one here, the median 
provides us with the best estimate of central tendency. 
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Highlands Water Project is the source of much of South Africa’s water.  
Botswana’s achievement is all the more notable given the extreme aridity of its 
climate and can be traced to the fact that 98 percent of Batswana live in areas 
with piper water systems.  South Africa’s figure masks a great deal of variation 
where 14 percent of black respondents still often go without clean water 
compared to all other South Africans where this condition is virtually unknown 
(see Table 2).  
 
Home Security  
The average Zimbabwean ‘sometimes’ ‘felt unsafe from crime in your home’ in 
the previous twelve months.  Elsewhere, the median response was to do so 
‘rarely’, except in Botswana where the average respondent ‘never’ felt insecure.  
Again, it should be noted that an exceptionally large share of Basotho (36 
percent) feel unsafe (see Table 3).   
 
South Africa presents an interesting case study.  The country has endured a rapid 
rise in violent crime in the past six years and has one of the highest rates of 
violent crime in the world (behind only Venezuela and Swaziland) (Bruce, 2001; 
Dynes, 2001; Pedrag, 2000.  Sixteen percent of all deaths in South Africa result 
from trauma, compared to 5 percent globally.  Until recent escalations in AIDS 
mortality, crime has been the leading cause of injury and death (Budlender, 
2000).  Large proportions of South Africans rate crime as the ‘most important 
problem facing the country’ and there is a heated debate surrounding 
government performance fighting crime as well as the public availability of 
police crime statistics.  Despite this, the average South Africans told 
Afrobarometer interviewers that they ‘rarely’ felt unsafe in the previous year. 
This figure is likely to be much higher now than just four years ago.  In a 
differently worded and framed question, surveys by the Human Sciences 
Research Council show that the proportions who say they ‘felt safe’ or ‘very 
safe on most days’ fell dramatically from 73 percent in 1994 to 44 percent in 
1999 (Nedbank Institute for Security Studies, 2000).  In contrast to the usual 
patterns of racial inequality in South Africa, both black and white South 
Africans offer a fairly similar pattern of insecurity, and both are more insecure 
than coloured or Indian respondents.  
 
Medical Treatment  
There is a wide variance in people’s ability to secure medicine and medical 
treatment across the region.  The average Namibian, Zambian and Zimbabwean 
had ‘sometimes’  ‘gone without medicine or medical treatment that you needed’.  
The median response in Malawi, Lesotho and South Africa is ‘rarely’ to do 
without necessary treatment.  Again, the average Batswana feel they ‘never’ do 
without.  Aside from the average response, it should be emphasised that almost 
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one third of Zambians (32 percent) and Basotho (30 percent) say they ‘often’ go 
without needed medicine or treatment (Table 4). 
 
Cash Income  
Afrobarometer research partners in Southern Africa decided not to attempt to 
measure income because of their experiences with the difficulty of obtaining 
valid income data.  However, we did decide to include it in this set of questions.  
Rather than asking people how much money they make, which brings with it a 
whole host of attendant problems, we asked people how often they had ‘gone 
without a cash income’ during the previous twelve months14 (Table 5).  
 
The median Basotho (fully 64 percent) says they or their family had ‘often’ done 
so (a figure far higher than any other country in Southern Africa).  Elsewhere, 
the median respondent ‘sometimes’ went without a cash income.  The only 
exception was South Africa with its system of, albeit limited, welfare and 
maintenance payments, where the average response was to go without ‘rarely’.15  
However, this average response masks great income inequality inside the 
country where the average black response is to go without ‘sometimes’, 
compared to ‘never’ for white, coloured and Indian respondents. 
 
Home Fuel   
In most of Southern Africa, the average person said they or their family had 
‘rarely’ ‘gone without enough fuel to heat your home or cook your food’.  In 
South Africa and Botswana, the average person ‘never’ experienced this.  
Looking below the average response, we can see that, reflecting their sparse 
supplies of natural firewood and the cold winters that necessitate home heating, 
32 percent of Basotho ‘often’ go without enough fuel (Table 6).  
 
                                                     
14  The 2001 Tanzania Afrobarometer survey did ask people for actual monthly 
income.  We found that while Tanzanians with lower reported levels of money income were 
more likely to go without basic necessities the correlation was modest at best, and generally 
weak.  The Pearson r correlation for income and going without food was -.21, water -.09, 
medical treatment -.17, electricity –15 and schooling -.12.  All correlations were statistically 
significant at the .001 level of probability.  See Chaligha et al, 2002. 
15  Approximately 7 percent of South Africans (in 2.9 million households) receive 
some sort of government social assistance on a monthly basis.  Estimates place government 
pensions as accounting for 28 percent of all income for the ‘ultra poor’ and 6 percent for the 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In general, the typical Southern African had ‘often’ (most probably meaning 
‘always’) ‘gone without electricity in your home’.  In Namibia, the average 
response is to ‘sometimes’ go without, and in South Africa with its giant 
electrical parastatal, Eskom, the average response was to do so ‘rarely’ (Table 
7).   
 
In general it appears that Southern Africans in 1999-2000 were most likely to go 
without electricity, medical treatment, and food.  They were more likely to 
secure water, home fuel and home safety.  But for the typical citizen, it appears 
that difficulties are more likely to be intermittent rather than chronic.  For 
comparative purposes, these shortages appear to be far more frequent than in 
Russia, a society that has experienced considerable economic shock over the 
past decade.  Comparable data shows that the median Russians report that they 
rarely go without food, heating, electricity or clothing that they really need 
(Rose, 2002).  
  
Moreover, while a focus on the central tendency or median response is useful, it 
tends to under-emphasise the significant proportions of people who are living in 
severe destitution.  Tables 8 and 9 recount how each country performs across 
each basic necessity, with Table 8 listing only the proportions who ‘often’ and 
‘sometimes’ go without and Table 9 listing only those who do so ‘often’.  
Focussing on Table 9, it is evident that considerable proportions of Southern 
Africans experience chronic absence of basic necessities.   On average, almost 
one half of Basotho are destitute across all basic necessities, as are 
approximately one third of Malawians, Zimbabweans and Zambians.   
 
 
The Afrobarometer Lived Poverty Index 
 
Summarising the information in another way, Table 10 presents an average 
index score of lived poverty for each country that runs from 1 (complete 
satisfaction of basic needs) to 4 (frequent shortages of basic needs) (Table 8).  
Viewed in this way, Botswana (1.98) and South Africa (2.00) are the least 
impoverished, or relatively wealthiest countries in the region, and statistically 
indistinguishable from each other.  Namibia (2.39) is third, with Malawi (2.48), 
Zimbabwe (2.55) and Zambia (2.60) tied for fifth.  Lesotho rates seventh, the 
poorest country of those we have surveyed in Southern Africa (2.76).  The 
standard deviations around these mean scores are largest in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa, and are almost as large as for the entire region, indicating that 
inequalities in the enjoyment of basic necessities are greatest in these countries.  
 
15 
Lesotho’s very high level of lived poverty is echoed by a recent national poverty 
study which, using a money metric poverty line, defined 68 percent of the 
population as ‘poor’, a significant increase since 1990.  The authors outlined a 
paradox between the country’s income, poverty and recent periods of economic 
growth (averaging 5 percent between 1990 and 1997) as well as a range of other 
indicators that suggest that Basotho should be doing much better than they are.  
For example, Basotho have established homes with reasonably sized plots with 
gardens and trees, sufficiently sized fields, relatively high levels of livestock 
ownership, fairly equitable access to water and natural resources, high levels of 
access to schools, high levels of literacy, and a good system of primary health 
care that eradicated polio and other diseases common to other African countries.  
Asking ‘How can there be widespread poverty in a country which, by African 
standards, is relatively well-off?’ the authors point to inequality.  Sharp declines 
in wage employment due to retrenchment of mine workers and simultaneous 
increases in civil service and private sector salaries have resulted in an 
extremely high level of inequality: its GINI coefficient (.60) is one of the highest 
in the world.      
 
They also point to limited livelihood skills.  Basotho tend to work in jobs 
created by others.  They rarely combine effectively the country’s abundance of 
soil, water and labour.  Farmers continue dry-land mono-cropping even in the 
face of profitable alternatives.16 
 
In Zambia’s case, extensive poverty appears to derive less from the natural 
environment, which is much more bountiful than in Lesotho, than from the 
under-performance of its government and people.  Indeed, the fact that well-
managed development programs can overcome an unpromising resource 




                                                     
16  John Gay & David Hall, Poverty and Livelihoods In Lesotho, 2000 - More Than A 
Mapping Exercise: Summary Volume (Maseru, Lesotho: Sechaba Consultants, 2000), pp. 1-3.  
The study uses a poverty line of M80 per household member per month (US1$ = M6.8) (Gay 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10:  Afrobarometer Lived Poverty Index 
 
Country Mean N Std. Dev. 
Botswana 1.98 1147 .68 
South Africa 2.00 2137 .76 
Namibia 2.39 1045 .67 
Malawi 2.48 1186 .62 
Zimbabwe 2.55 1065 .78 
Zambia 2.60 1042 .64 
Lesotho 2.76 1114 .68 





The Afrobarometer measured individual health in two ways.  First of all, we 
asked respondents about their physical health:  ‘In the last month, how much of 
the time has your physical health reduced the amount of work you would 
normally do inside or outside your home: Was it often, sometimes, rarely or 
never?’  A second item probed their state of mental health:  ‘In the last month, 
how much of the time have you felt so worried or anxious that you have felt 
tired, worn out, or exhausted?’    
 
In 1999-2000, the median respondent in Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
indicated that they had ‘sometimes’ been both unable to do any work due to 
physical health, or were mentally exhausted.  This happened ‘rarely’ to the 
average respondent in Malawi, Namibia, Botswana and South Africa.  It ‘never’ 
occurred for the typical white, coloured or Indian South Africans (see Tables 12 
and 13).   
 
Not only are Basotho most likely to go without basic necessities on a frequent 
basis, they are by far the most likely to report frequent mental or physical 
illness.  Four in ten (42 percent) were ‘often’ physically ill and one half (51 
percent) had often been mentally exhausted.  We wondered if the timing of the 
survey influenced the responses, but it was conducted in April and May -- late 
summer and early autumn -- so the weather presumably did not cause higher 
than usual levels of illness.  The reasons for this very high level of illness are 
complex.  Firstly, due to labour migration to South Africa, the resident 
population is not a normally distributed population, but is largely female and 
disproportionately old.  This accounts for some of the disparity, but Basotho 
report more ill health than anyone else in the region within each age category.   
Secondly, those who stay may be those who are unable to migrate because of 
poor health, thus creating a disproportionately unhealthy resident population 
(Whiteside et al, 2002). 
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The physical consequences of sickness and disease not only make a person ill 
but also are also likely to lead to higher levels of anxiety and depression.  
Confirming this logic, we find a very strong correlation between the physical 
and mental illness.17  This enables us to create a scale of ill health where ‘1’ 
means people missed no work due to physical or mental illness in the month 
preceding the interview, and ‘4’ means they frequently missed work for these 
reasons (Table 11).  By this standard, the healthiest country in the region is 
South Africa (2.05), followed by Namibia (2.17).  Zimbabwe and Lesotho have 
the highest rates of sickness in the region, statistically indistinguishable at 2.77 
and 2.79.  
 
Table 11:  Ill Health Index 
 
Country Mean N Std. Dev. 
South Africa 2.05 2188 .94 
Namibia 2.17 1149 .92 
Botswana 2.28 1183 1.01 
Malawi 2.29 1206 .92 
Zambia 2.57 1187 .97 
Zimbabwe 2.77 1182 .99 
Lesotho 2.79 1172 1.12 
Total 2.38 9267 1.02 
 
As indicated earlier, while poverty researchers have often attempted to include 
measures of individual health as an indicator of poverty, we find that in 
Southern Africa, while there is a strong relation between the two, individual 
health is empirically distinct from individual incidence of poverty.18  More than 
one in ten (13 percent) of all respondents interviewed across the region were 
both ‘often’ physically and mentally ill.  With the exception of Lesotho (due to 
the considerations outlined above), the cross-national variations in these extreme 
cases correlate quite strongly with cross-national differences in AIDS illnesses, 
suggesting that our aggregate estimates of ill-health reflect a good deal of AIDS 
related illness.19 
                                                     
17  Pearson’s r = .60, probability = .000, n = 9267. 
18   Pearson’s r = 41, probability = .000, n = 8568. 
19  For the six counties other than Lesotho, a measure of ‘severe illness’ (the national 
percentage of those who are both ‘often’ physically and mentally ill) and modelled data on 
current AIDS cases correlates at (Pearson’s r) .70.  The same measure correlates with 




















































































































































































































































































































































A third dimension of well being is tapped by a series of items that measure the 
presence of development infrastructure in the respondents’ immediate vicinity.  
The results reveal that with the exception of Botswana, and to a lesser extent 
South Africa, governments in the region have not succeeded in delivering basic 
development infrastructure to communities.   
 
Access to Electricity Grids and Piped Water    
In Botswana, Afrobarometer interviewers observed electricity grids within the 
immediate Enumerator Area of 97 percent of respondents and piped water 
systems in 98 percent.  The numbers in South Africa were 70 percent and 65 
percent respectively.  For all other five countries, however, the proportions for 
both services generally range between 30 percent and 50 percent of respondent’s 
immediate surroundings (see Table 14).  
 
One reason that access to services is not the same thing as lived poverty is that 
the presence of infrastructure does not necessarily translate into widespread 
household access.  This is most clearly observable in Botswana where 97 
percent of respondents live in areas with an electricity grid but just 28 percent of 
households are hooked up to it.  Virtually all Batswana live in areas serviced 
with water (98 percent), yet just 58 percent of households have piped water into 
the household (though in this case, many households probably have access to 
piped outdoor or communal taps).   
 
Only in South Africa (68 percent) and Botswana (58 percent) do large majorities 
of people have piped water into their household.  Beside these two countries, the 
figures run from 39 percent in Zimbabwe to just 7 percent in Lesotho.  Only in 
South Africa (78 percent) is electricity linked to a wide proportion of 
households.  Elsewhere, the figures run from 42 percent (Zimbabwe) to just 4 
percent in Lesotho.  
 
South Africa has only reached these levels since its democratisation in 1994.  As 
recently as 1995 it was estimated that just 21 percent of all household had access 
to piped water.  The 1996 Census reported 45 percent of households with an 
inside tap and 58 percent of households with access to electricity 
(Reconstruction and Development Programme, 1995; Hirschowitz et al, 2000: 
66).  The measured level of access to electricity actually outstrips the target of 
72 percent by 2000 set in 1994 by South Africa’s Reconstruction and 
Development Programme, a target that required 450,000 new hook-ups per year 
(Stavrou, 2000). While apartheid legacies have left black South Africans clearly 
worse off than their white, coloured or Indian counterparts in terms of access to 
household services, some aspects of the new government’s ambitious 
21 
Reconstruction and Development Program have at least made them better off 
than people elsewhere in the region.  For example, 59 percent of black South 
Africans have piped water in the home and 70 percent have electricity 
connections, figures that exceed national aggregates anywhere else in the region.  
 
Again, it is clear that while state-driven water projects make an important 
contribution to water security, they do not guarantee it.  Among those 
respondents who live in serviced areas and that have water piped into their 
houses, 69 percent never go without, but 18 percent still say they go without 
‘often’ or ‘sometimes’.  This may represent people without sufficient cash to 
pay their water accounts, or signify interruptions in supply by state authorities.  
Among those who live in serviced areas, but do not have water piped into their 
houses, 50 percent ‘never’ go without, and 36 percent do without ‘often’ or 
‘sometimes’.  Indeed, one in ten people (12 percent) who live in unserviced 
areas still manage to have water piped into the house, most likely from a 
borehole or dam.  Among this group, 64 percent ‘never’ do without, and 26 
percent go without ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’.  But clearly the worst conditions are 
found amongst those who live in unserviced areas and do not have internal piped 
water:  just one third of these people (35 percent) ‘never’ do without, and one 
half (52 percent) go without ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’. 
 
Similarly, state-financed electricity grids drastically reduce the likelihood that 
Southern Africans have to go without it, but do not totally determine these 
prospects.  In serviced areas, 38 percent of houses still are not hooked up to the 
grid.  Yet 16 percent of these households say they ‘never’ go without electricity, 
because they may have their own generators, or because they may have illegally 
‘hooked up’ into the grid.  In unserviced areas, 13 percent of people say they 
have an electricity hook up into their homes, possibly signifying incomplete 
water grids in those areas.  Of those without any household hook up, 11 percent 
say they ‘never’ do without – either because they have their own generators, or 
because they actually do not think they need electricity and thus are not going 
without. 
 
Health Clinics  
We see a very different pattern with regard to the presence of health clinics.   
Zambia leads the region with clinics present in 65 percent of the primary 
sampling units.  Clinics were available in four out of ten sampling sites in 
Namibia (44 percent), Malawi (42 percent) and Zimbabwe (41 percent) and 
slightly less than that in South Africa (35 percent).  Just one quarter of sites have 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Perhaps surprisingly, the construction of government health clinics does not 
reduce the degree with which people go without medical care: across the entire 
region, there is no statistical relationship between the frequency with which one 
goes without necessary medical treatment, and whether or there is a health clinic 
present in the immediate area.  However, having a health clinic in the immediate 
area does make a slight impact on health.  45 percent of respondents who live 
close to a health clinic report that they ‘never’ miss work due to health 
problems, compared to 35 percent of those who do not have a health clinic in 
their area.20   
 
Other Development Infrastructure    
South Africa has the highest levels of development in terms of sewerage 
systems (53 percent live in an enumerator area in which sewerage systems 
operate to most houses); paved sidewalks (44 percent live in areas in which 
interviewers could see pavements), post offices (24 percent live in enumerator 
areas with a post office) and access to rail transport (15 percent).  At the other 
end of the spectrum, Lesotho again has the lowest levels with regard to sewerage 
(9 percent), pavements (4 percent) and rail transport (1 percent).  Botswana (10 
percent) and Zimbabwe (12 percent) have the lowest rates of access to a post 
office. 
 
We see very different patterns in terms of the presence of security forces.  
Interviewers observed police stations in the enumerator area of 42 percent of 
Zambian respondents, and witnessed police or police vehicles on the streets in 
30 percent of cases, both the highest levels in the region.  In contrast, there were 
police stations in the immediate area in just 5 percent of cases in Botswana, and 
police or police vehicles were observed before or after 18 percent of all 
interviews in South Africa. 
 
We created an index of development infrastructure measuring the absence or 
presence of all the items just discussed, each scored 0 or 1 (Table 15).  Across 
the region South Africa has the highest level of development infrastructure (0.46 
on a scale of 0 to 1), followed closely by Botswana (0.39).   The lowest levels of 
development are found in Malawi (0.12) and Lesotho (0.08). 
 
 
                                                     
20  Kendall’s Tau b = .06; Significance = .000. 
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Table 15:  Development Infrastructure Index 
 
Country Mean N Std. Dev. 
South Africa 0.46 2119 .33 
Botswana 0.39 1100 .17 
Namibia 0.24 867 .40 
Zimbabwe 0.23 1026 .37 
Zambia 0.22 1074 .38 
Malawi 0.12 1180 .28 
Lesotho 0.08 1120 .20 





Well-functioning communities are those that also have private and civic sectors 
that, by themselves or in partnership with the state, provide a range of services 
that meet community needs such as transportation, recreation, civic life and 
consumer goods.  When viewed in these terms, communities in Malawi, 
Zambia, and to some extent Zimbabwe appear to be the most well developed, 
and communities in Lesotho and Botswana the least.  However, the cross-
national patterns do change depending on the type of service in question.   
 
Eight in ten Zimbabweans (84 percent) live in Enumerator Areas with regular 
bus or taxi service; at the other end of the range, just over one third of 
Namibians (36 percent) do.   Eight in ten Zambians (88 percent) and Malawians 
(82 percent) have recreation facilities in their immediate area, while just over 
one third of Zimbabweans (36 percent) do.  Places of worship could be found in 
the immediate enumerator area of nine in ten Zambians (93 percent) and 
Malawians (87 percent) compared to just one half of Batswana (49 percent).  
Over one half of Zambians have immediate access to venues that can be used for 
community meetings compared to just one in ten Basotho (11 percent) and 
Batswana (9 percent) (Table 19).  
 
Commercially, Zambians (70 percent) have the highest levels of immediate 
access to informal markets that sell food and clothes and Batswana the lowest 
(15 percent).  However, when it comes to more formal commercial outlets, nine 
in ten Batswana (91 percent) and Basotho (90 percent) have a small shop (café, 
corner shop or spaza shop) close at hand, compared to just 16 percent of 
Malawians.  Four in ten Batswana (42 percent) and South Africans (44 percent) 
have immediate access to larger stores, or supermarkets that sell food or clothes 
compared to just 14 percent of Malawians.  
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We then created an index of community services measuring the presence or 
absence of the items just reviewed (Table 16).  The highest levels of community 
infrastructure can, perhaps surprisingly, be found in Zambia (0.53 on a scale of 0 
to 1).  The lowest level of community infrastructure, again perhaps surprisingly, 
is found in Botswana.  
  
Table 16:  Community Services Index 
 
Country Mean N Std. Dev. 
Zambia 0.53 1089 .24 
South Africa 0.40 2200 .28 
Malawi 0.36 1206 .23 
Namibia 0.37 966 .36 
Zimbabwe 0.37 1137 .26 
Lesotho 0.37 1149 .24 
Botswana 0.33 1198 .18 





Interviewers also observed three elements related to the agricultural activity of 
the community.  In Lesotho, interviewers reported seeing ‘gardens or fields 
attached to households growing crops or vegetables’ in the enumerator area of 
99 percent of interviews, and ‘yards of fields attached to households containing 
livestock such as goats, sheep, cows or horses’ in 98 percent of cases (see Table 
20).  In contrast, these were seen in only 33 and 21 percent of sites in South 
Africa.  Interviewers also observed ‘yards, gardens or fields attached to 
households with trees growing in them that were higher than one storey’ within 
the immediate enumerator area of eight of ten sites in Lesotho (82 percent) and 
Zambia (85 percent), compared to just one in five Batswana (18 percent).  
Combining these into a single index (that runs from 0 to 1) shows that the 
greatest frequency of agricultural activity can be found in Lesotho (0.93) and the 
least in South Africa (0.27) (Table 17). 
 
 
Access to Schools 
 
Compared to other dimensions of development, governments across Southern 
Africa have done a good job in constructing affordable schools to which large  
26 
 
Table 17: Agricultural Activity Index 
Country Mean N Std Dev. 
Lesotho 0.93 1167 .16 
Malawi 0.83 1207 .24 
Zambia 0.78 1142 .29 
Zimbabwe 0.60 1166 .32 
Namibia 0.52 962 .42 
Botswana 0.34 1200 .33 
South Africa 0.27 2200 .34 
Total 0.58 9044 .40 
 
proportions of their populations have access.  Interviewers were able to identify 
a nearby school in eight of ten enumerator areas in Zambia (85 percent), 
Zimbabwe (80 percent) and Malawi (79 percent), but just 65 percent in Lesotho 
(see Table 21).  Nine in ten say there is ‘a school close by where you could 
afford to send your children’: in Zimbabwe (94 percent), Zambia (93 percent), 
Botswana (90 percent), and in South Africa (88 percent), compared to just 78 
and 77 percent in Namibia and Lesotho respectively.  We construct a scale of 
access to schools and find that Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe lead the region 
(statistically indistinguishable between 0.87 and 0.90 on a scale of 0 to 1) and 
Lesotho has the lowest relative levels of access (0.71) (Table 18). 
 
Table 18:  Access to Schools Index 
Country Mean N Std. Dev. 
Zambia 0.90 1143 .25 
Malawi 0.87 1200 .26 
Zimbabwe 0.87 1155 .24 
South Africa 0.83 2107 .30 
Botswana 0.82 1186 .28 
Namibia 0.77 989 .38 
Lesotho 0.71 1160 .36 





As noted earlier, four other pieces of information remained distinct from the 
dimensions we have already listed.  One piece consisted of Afrobarometer 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(with cement or brick walls, windows and metal or tile roofs) are most common 
in Botswana (84 percent) and available to more than half the population in all 
countries except Namibia (36 percent).  Half of the population occupies 
unimproved traditional housing (usually constructed of mud and thatch) in 
Namibia (50 percent); over one third in Malawi (41 percent); Zambia (35 
percent) and Zimbabwe (33 percent). Just one in ten South Africans (10 percent) 
and Batswana (9 percent) live in traditional houses. 
 
Sub-standard shelter in the form of temporary shack-type dwellings is most 
common in countries with an apartheid legacy of population displacement, 
namely South Africa (13 percent) and Namibia (8 percent), but also prevalent in 
Zambia (5 percent).  However, the figure for South Africa is undoubtedly a 
point on a downward trend curve as over one million low cost housing units had 
been built by 2001 (Sulcas, 2001: 2). 
 
However, even in countries such as Botswana where large proportions of people 
live in formal houses, it appears that other types of housing are scattered 
throughout neighbourhoods and towns.  While 84 percent of Batswana 
respondents live in formal houses, interviewers observed that only 29 percent of 
respondents lived in enumerator areas consisting entirely of formal housing.  Six 
in ten (59 percent) lived in enumerator areas counted as mostly formal, 
indicating the presence of at least some other types of housing in the immediate 
area.  The prevalence of large private or government housing projects (indicated 
by enumerator areas consisting wholly of formal houses) is seen in South Africa 





To measure adult education, we asked respondents for their level of highest 
educational attainment.  Proportions of adults with no formal schooling are 
relatively high in four countries: Botswana (17 percent), Namibia (16 percent), 
Lesotho (15 percent) and Malawi (13 percent).  The median respondent in 
Lesotho has only some primary education and in Malawi had completed primary 
school.   In the other five countries, the median respondent had at least some 
high school education.  White and coloured South Africans possessed the 
highest educational attainment as the median respondent had completed high 
school (Table 24).    
 
Even with the legacy of apartheid education in South Africa, South Africans and 
black South Africans exhibit higher levels of education than any other Southern 
African country.   Forty percent of South Africans (and 35 percent of blacks) 
have completed high school.  At the other end of the spectrum, just 16 percent of 
30 
Malawians and 7 percent of Basotho have done so.  At the same time, while 
black South Africans exhibit higher levels of education than people in any other 






Unemployment and underemployment are widespread in the region.  
Afrobarometer surveys in Southern Africa asked people a three-part question.  
First, were they working?  If so, was it part time or full time?  And if not, were 
they looking for work?  Our unemployment estimate is derived by the following 
formula: 
 
% Not Working but Looking for Work 
100%  -  % Not Working and Not Looking For Work 
 
Our confidence in our results is enhanced by the fact that our estimate for South 
Africa (36 percent of the workforce 18 years of age and above) is statistically 
the same as the ‘expanded rate’ of 36 percent estimated by a Statistics South 
Africa labour force survey conducted at about the same time.21  Across six 
Southern African countries, unemployment in 1999-2000 ranged in a band from 
33 percent (in Zimbabwe) to 45 percent (in Botswana).  Lesotho’s figure stands 
far outside this band at an astounding 76 percent (see Table 25).  
                                                     
21  See Katzenellenbogen (2001:3). Based on the ‘narrow’ definition of 
unemployment, the September 2000 Stats SA survey of 30,000 households put joblessness at 
25.8 percent. Using the ‘expanded’ or ‘broad’ definition, unemployment was 35.9 percent. 
The expanded formulation includes discouraged job seekers, those who have not looked for 
jobs for the past month but would like to work.  
 
% Not Working But Looking for Work Or Would Like to Work 
100% - Not Working and Who Do Not Want To Work 
 
It might be pointed out that the similarity is spurious since the Afrobarometer appears to use 
the ‘narrow’ definition (which excludes those who are not actively seeking work but would 
like to work).  But while the ‘narrow’ official estimate excludes those who have not sought 
work in the past month, the Afrobarometer question merely ask people whether they were 
looking for work, with no stringent time period.  But we feel the item captures both those who 
are either actively looking and those who simply desire to work, which makes it equivalent to 
the expanded definition.  One other difference is that the Stats SA data are based only on 
respondents aged 16-64, while the Afrobarometer sample includes anyone over the age of 18.  
For discussion and debate about the ‘narrow’ and ‘expanded’ definitions, see Schlemmer and 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lesotho’s extraordinary level of unemployment might be explained by the fact 
that during the survey period many employed males were out of the country 
working in South African mines.  However, 81 percent of Basotho women are 
also unemployed, far higher than the regional average of 52 per cent; this 
suggests that unemployment would be exceptionally high in this country even if 
those men had been present during the survey.  At the same time, higher than 
average levels of female unemployment may be related to the phenomenon of 
mine migrancy as the irregular delivery of remittance from mine employment 
may force a higher than average number of women head of households into the 
labour force.  This may be reflected in the fact that the female work force in 
Lesotho (69 percent of all women are working or looking for work) is as large as 
in South Africa (70 percent) and Botswana (67 percent), two much more 
developed economies, and significantly higher than countries with more similar 
economies such as Namibia (60 percent) or Malawi (27 percent).  There is also a 
much smaller gender gap in Lesotho’s rate of unemployment than the rest of the 
region.  Across the region as a whole, female unemployment is one third higher 
among women than men, but in Lesotho it is just ten percent higher (81 percent 
versus 72 percent).  
 
Not only is unemployment extensive, but also the employment that exists is 
fractional and temporary, especially in the region’s more industrial economies.  
Approximately one third of all current employment is part time in Zimbabwe 
(34 percent), Lesotho (31 percent) and South Africa (30 percent) and between 
one fifth and one quarter in the other four countries.  Needless to say, part-time 
jobs do not provide full salaries and usually lack benefits.  Secondly, many jobs 
are temporary, especially in the more advanced economies.  Across the region, 
14 percent of those who currently enjoy full-time employment went without a 
cash job for at least one month in the previous year, a figure that goes as high as 
18 percent in Zambia and 22 percent in Lesotho.  Four in ten Southern Africans 
(40 percent) with part-time jobs were unemployed for at least one month during 





A final measure of well being is to look at what people who are, or who have 
been recently employed are actually doing.  We took the myriad responses to 
our question about occupation and grouped them together into five main 
categories. 
First, the Owner/Employer category comprises anyone who owns a business and 
employs others, the self-employed, managing directors, or commercial farmers.  
This constitutes what Russell Dalton (1998) has called the ‘old middle class’, or 
in Marxist terms those who own or manage the means of production.  Malawi (5 
34 
percent) and South Africa (5 percent) had the largest proportions falling into this 
category with Lesotho (1 percent) the least.  Second, the 
Professional/Supervisory category comprises office supervisors, industrial 
foremen, and professionals such as lawyers, engineers or doctors.  This 
constitutes what Dalton calls the ‘new middle class’, those who live middle-
class lifestyles but do not own or run the means of production.  Zambia (16 
percent), Zimbabwe (14 percent) and Botswana (14 percent) have the largest 
proportions in this sector, and Lesotho (5 percent) the least (see Table 26).  
 
The Worker category consists of non-manual and manual, skilled and unskilled 
workers in the formal and informal sectors, as well as farm workers, domestic 
workers, soldiers, police and other security workers.  South Africa has the 
largest working class (53 percent) and Malawi (24 percent) the smallest.  The 
Subsistence Farmer category comprises yeomen or peasant farmers, or any 
farmers who did not feel they ran a commercial farm.  The largest proportion is 
found in Malawi (33 percent) and the smallest in South Africa (1 percent).22   
 
Finally, the Never Had a Job category comprises anyone who has either never 
worked or not worked long enough to consider themselves as workers.  It is 
important to note that this category does not include housewives.  Lesotho (23 
percent), Botswana and Zimbabwe (each at 22 percent) and Namibia (21 
percent) have the largest proportions of ‘long term’ unemployed citizens.  In 
South Africa, the proportion of hard-core unemployed is at least twice as high 
among blacks (18 percent) than the nearest figure for other racial group (Indian 
respondents, at 8 percent).  
 
Finally, there are three other categories that do not fit into the above 
occupational categories.  The proportions of the public that consider themselves 
housewives varies widely across the region from Namibia (19 percent) to just 8 
percent in Botswana and South Africa (though 20 percent of white South 
Africans place themselves into this category).  The proportions of the national 
samples (which include only those 18 years and older) that call themselves 
students are highest in Botswana and South Africa (9 percent) to just 1 percent 
in Lesotho.  Finally, the disabled are a constant 1 to 2 percent of all country 
samples.  
 
                                                     
22  That South Africa has the smallest agricultural work force and the largest industrial 
workforce in the region supports arguments made by Jeremy Seekings (2000) about the 
inappropriate images of South Africa as a ‘society of peasants’ still held by many 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Advantages of a ‘Lived Poverty’ Approach 
 
We have now seen that well being, at least in Southern Africa, is multi-
dimensional and cannot be captured with one single construct.  Let us now focus 
on the set of items that we argue measures lived poverty, which we believe has 





First of all, we believe a ‘lived poverty’ approach is simply a more valid 
measure of the concept of poverty than other existing measures.  While it may 
not measure poverty as precisely as economists might like, it is a direct (rather 
than indirect) measure of people’s ability to secure the basic necessities of life: 
what we argue lies at the core of poverty.  Moreover, it isolates poverty and 
measures it separately from the antecedent conditions that may (or may not) 
enable people to secure these necessities (such as a cash income) or the 
consequences that may or may not result from securing these necessities, such as 
a longer, healthier or happier life.   
 
The poverty literature often fails to distinguish these things operationally and 
thus conflates measures of poverty with measures of antecedent causes (often 
referred to as resources, assets or capabilities) and measures of consequences 
such as health, longevity or happiness.  We realize that what we call antecedent 
causes are not totally ‘exogenous’ (to use the language of the economist).  For 
example, shortfalls in income may mean people ‘go without’ health care, which, 
in turn, might mean that people lose their jobs, and thus face increased health 
problems.  However, while we may not be able to demonstrate conclusively a 
strict temporal sequence between antecedent capabilities, poverty and its 
consequences, the alternative of mixing them together in one measure is worse. 
 
Figure 1:  Poverty, its Antecedents and its Consequences 
 




Literacy    Securing Basic    Happier Life 
Education        Necessities    Longer Life 
Land         Healthier Life 
Access to Services 
 
A great deal of effort has focussed on measuring antecedent conditions of 
poverty.  The most obvious example can be seen in the measurement of income, 
assets or expenditure that lay at the core of the broad household survey tradition.   
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Widely used as an indicator of welfare and poverty, income is very difficult to 
measure accurately and reliably.  Because it is derived from multiple sources, it 
can be defined in different ways.  Non-money metric forms of income, such as 
the value of public services, public goods, barter or in-kind income, are 
extremely difficult to identify and measure.  This is especially problematic in 
rural areas or barter economies where large numbers of people may depend on 
these types of income.  In Malawi, for example, the Afrobarometer survey found 
that approximately two-thirds of the national sample was not receiving a cash 
income from a job nor looking for a job.  The sensitivity of the subject can lead 
to inaccurate responses but even if respondents are willing to answer honestly, 
they may not accurately recall all sources of income (Inserra, 1996: 1; Kunbar, 
2001: 7; Kunbar and Squire, 1999: 13; Alderman et al, 2000: 5 and 13).    
 
A different approach attempts to measure household assets as a proxy for 
income.  Assets are seen as indicative of long-term household status since they 
represent sources of potential future income.  While assets appear to be easier to 
measure (since respondents can conceptualize them they can be visually verified 
rather than recalled), they must be turned into a money metric value, and such 
valuations must also take into account depreciation or appreciation – both of 
which may be very complex (Inserra, 1996: 2). 
 
A far more fundamental critique of measuring poverty through income is that 
while the lack or absence of income may be strongly related to poverty, they are 
not the same things.  Income is a means to an end.  Higher income may enable 
people to do better in their quest to obtain the basic necessities of life, but this is 
by no means certain.   Summarising the limited literature on the subject, Ravi 
Kunbar and Lyn Squire (1999: 15) conclude that ‘while there is clearly an 
overlap – those who lack income are also those who are less well educated and 
suffer more sickness – the correspondence is less than complete and can, in 
some cases, be quite small’.   
 
While there is a broad aggregate, country-level correlation between income and 
things like life expectancy, literacy and infant mortality, income growth does not 
necessarily translate into improvements in health status or educational 
attainment.  Growth provides an opportunity to improve basic well being, but it 
is an opportunity that a country must seize (Kunbar and Squire, 1999: 17).  
Countries falling in the same per capita income brackets may have widely 
varying life expectancy and infant mortality rates.23  For instance, South Africa 
has a higher GDP per capita than five other upper-middle income countries 
                                                     
23  For instance, the 1994 Human Development Report placed Sri Lanka, Nicaragua, 
Pakistan and Guinea all in the same $400 to $500 per capita income bracket.  Yet they had 
respective life expectancy rates of 71, 65, 58 and 44, and respective infant mortality rates of 
24, 53, 99 and 135 per 1,000 live births. See Kunbar and Squire, 1999:17. 
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(Poland, Thailand, Venezuela, Botswana and Brazil), but performs worse than 
all of them with regard to life expectancy, infant mortality and adult illiteracy 
(May et al, 2000: 22).  At the household level, studies in South African have 
demonstrated that almost one third of the most severely deprived households 
come from middle level income quintiles.  Approximately 3.7 million of 11.7 
million severely deprived people, the vast majority of whom live in rural areas, 
would be missed by a pure income-based measure.24  Similarly, a Cote d’Ivoire 
study found that less than half those identified as ‘poor’ according to per capita 
consumption adjusted for family composition were also identified as ‘poor’ by a 
criterion of average adult educational levels (Glewwe and van der Gaag cited in 
Kunbar and Squire, 1999: 15).  Finally, a study of six developing countries has 
found only modest correlations between income and non-money metric welfare 
indicators (Appleton and Song cited in Kunbar and Squire, 1999: 15).   
 
For these and other reasons, poverty researchers have searched for alternative 
measures.  Many have been attracted by Amartya Sen’s focus on the ability of 
households or individuals to command the resources necessary for a decent 
standard of living.  Poverty, according to the United Nations Development 
Program (1998: 14) is ‘the denial of opportunities and choices most basic to 
human development to lead a long, healthy, creative life and to enjoy a decent 
standard of living, freedom, dignity, self-esteem and respect from others’.  This 
had led to a shift away from pure income measures to focus on ‘capabilities’ or 
‘opportunities’ based measures of poverty.  According to South African 
development researcher Julian May (2000: 5), a ‘capabilities’ approach should 
measure the ‘inability of individuals, households or entire communities to 
command sufficient resources to satisfy a socially acceptable minimum standard 
of living’. 
 
A common way to capture capabilities is to create a ‘poverty line’ or 
‘subsistence line’ consisting of an estimated benchmark of what it costs to 
secure basic needs, and then compare that to household consumption, or the 
goods and services consumed or used by a household measured through 
expenditure data.  Poverty is usually expressed as the percentage of individuals 
or households living below that line (Alderman et al, 2000; Carter and May, 
2001).  While a consumption estimate is easier to gather and provides a better 
picture of the standard of living (since it tracks the actual goods and services 
used by the household), we do not always know whether the consumption came 
from increased income, spent savings, or borrowing (Inserra, 1996: 2). 
                                                     
24  Approximately 35 percent of the most severely deprived households (determined 
by a 12 indicator index of household well-being) in South Africa in 1993 were drawn from 
the 2d, 3d and even 4th quintiles of the Income Poverty scale (Klasen, 1997 cited in May, 
Woolard & Klasen, 2000: 40-46). 
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Moreover, the resulting poverty depends a great deal on where the poverty line 
is set and the assumptions that go into deciding what is necessary to secure a 
decent living.25 
 
Another approach has been to include access to public services into the measure 
of poverty.  In South Africa, for example, Stephen Klasen (cited in May et al, 
2000) has developed a deprivation measure based on a composite index of 
twelve household indicators measured on five point scales: education of all adult 
members, income, number of household durables, type of house, type of water 
access, type of sanitation facility, main source of cooking fuel, proportion of 
adult members employed, type of transport used to get to work, proportion of 
stunted children in household, type of health facility used in last illness, and 
level of satisfaction of household. Alternatively, Statistics South Africa (2000) 
has developed measures of household infrastructure (a formal house, electricity, 
water tap, flush toilet, refuse removal, telephone) and household circumstances 
(expenditure, levels of education, unemployment, size of household, and number 
of children under five).   
 
But as we have already seen with the Afrobarometer data on access to water and 
electricity, access by itself does not ensure that basic needs have been met.   
People with no formal access may never go without if they have a repertoire of 
informal survival strategies:  people with no access to piped water may be able 
to get potable water through other means; people who are not hooked up to an 
electricity grid may have a portable generator, or more simply may not need it if 
they live in a warm climate or in a country with an abundance of natural fuel 
resources.  Thus, income, consumption and access based measure all suffer the 
same flaw:  they do not measure the actual enjoyment of life’s basic necessities, 
but rather draw inferences from plausible proxy measures.  
 
Other approaches make the opposite mistake and conflate poverty with its 
consequences.  The United Nation’s Development Programme created two 
prominent examples.  The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite 
national level index drawn from aggregate measures of longevity (life 
expectancy), educational attainment (adult literacy and national school 
                                                     
25  For example, based on expenditure data from the 1996 South African Income and 
Expenditure Survey, Statistics South Africa estimates household poverty in South Africa to be 
28 percent using a R800 per household income per month line, the line at which households 
are defined as poor for the equitable share grant from the national government to 
municipalities) and individual poverty to be 48 percent (using a poverty line of R250 per 
month per capita income within the household).  Estimates using income data put the two 
estimates at 28 percent and 48 percent respectively.  But on income data from the national 
census of the same year, the poverty estimates are 52 percent and 61 percent respectively.  
See Alderman et al, 2000: 6-10. 
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enrolment rates) and standard of living (GDP per capita).  Its Human Poverty 
Index (HPI) consists of the percentage not expected to live to the age of 40, 
percentage of illiterate adults, and the percentage of people without access to 
safe water and health services.  Attendance at school and literacy may enable 
people to escape from poverty (but may not).  As demonstrated above, access to 
safe water and health care clinics does not necessarily mean people can afford 
the water, or are healthy.  Increased life expectancy and longevity, surely, are a 
consequence of poverty (or more precisely the absence of poverty).  
Alternatively, a short, unhealthy life can as easily be the consequence of 
smoking and lung disease, or even of things normally associated with affluence, 
such as heart disease. 
 
Thus the Afrobarometer Lived Poverty Index (LPI) asks people directly to 
assess their ability to secure the basic necessities of life, rather than inferring it 
from things such income, expenditure, assets, or access to services.  One 
objection that we have encountered in presentations to various audiences of 
economists and development researchers is that the LPI depends on self-reported 
perceptions and judgments, or what most economists appear to call ‘qualitative’ 
data.  This objection calls our attention to the peculiar way that economists 
dichotomize poverty data.  This dichotomy is nicely illustrated by May, 
Woolard and Klasen (2000: 25) who divide poverty research into ‘‘objective’ 
social indicators, such as income levels, consumption expenditure, life 
expectancy and housing standards’ versus ‘subjective indicators, based upon the 
attitudes, needs and perceptions gathered directly from people – or indeed with 
people – through the use of participator research methodologies’.26  In other 
words, once we move beyond self reports of income or expenditure, many 
economists seem to think that subjective attitudes can only be captured though 
qualitative ‘participatory’ research.  This implies that people’s subjective 
experiences are interesting, but not sufficiently reliable or valid to merit 
quantitative measurement.  As World Bank economist Martin Revallion notes: 
‘oddly, while economists generally think that people are the best judges of their 
own welfare, they resist asking people how they feel’.27  Or, in the words of Paul 
Krugman: ‘economics is marked by a startling crudeness in the way it thinks 
about individuals and their motivations…. Economists are notoriously 
uninterested in how people think or feel’ (Krugman, 1994).  
 
                                                     
26 Alternatively, Carvalho and White (1997, cited in Kumbar, 2001: 18) define 
‘quantitative research’ as ‘one that typically uses random sample surveys and structured 
interviews to collect data – mainly quantifialbe data – and analyzes it using statistical 
techniques.  By contrast, the qualitative approach is defined as one that typically uses 
purposive sampling and semi-structured or interactive interviews to collect data – mainly data 
relating to people’s judgments, attitudes, preferences, priorities, and/or perceptions about a 
subject – and analyses it through sociological or anthropological research techniques’. 
27  Quoted in Kunbar (2001: 13). 
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But if we assume – as economists do – that representative, randomly-selected 
sample respondents can accurately recall expenditures or income from a range 
of various sources, they certainly should also be able to give us a reasonable 
idea of how often they went without vital necessities in the previous twelve 
months.  Thus the real issue is not between ‘objective, quantitative’ and 
‘subjective, qualitative’ research, but whether we systematically measure the 
experiences, judgments and preferences of representative samples of people so 
that we can obtain estimates of the extent of lived poverty where the precision is 
knowable, and that allow us to conduct statistical tests of hypotheses about the 
extent, causes and consequences of poverty.  This is not so much a matter of 
what Revallion (2001: 38-43) calls a ‘sequential mixing’ of techniques where 
participatory methods are used to generate hypotheses to be tested by 
quantitative research (which is to be desired), but of what he calls 
‘simultaneous’ mixing whereby measures of so-called ‘qualitative’ indicators of 






While the Lived Poverty Index (LPI) might be a more direct measure of 
differing levels of poverty, economists might desire a more precise, fine-grained 
measure than simply going without ‘rarely, sometimes or often’.  It certainly is 
possible to add additional items to tap further necessities, or to broaden the 
response scale to enable greater precision (e.g. how many days a month do you 
go without?).  However, we believe that the existing index includes the most 
fundamental necessities of life and that any additions would alter the results 
marginally.   However, this remains an empirical question.28  
 
We also believe that even in its existing form, the LPI already offers more 
precision than many other measures.  First of all, we can use ordinal distinctions 
between response categories to draw our own ‘poverty line’ and derive the total 
proportion of people or households falling under or over that line.  For example, 
we can easily calculate the percentage that, on average, ‘often’ go without these 
necessities; or we can broaden it and calculate the percentage that go without 
‘often’ or ‘sometimes’.  At the same time, because the LPI yields a continuous 
variable we do not simply have to divide people into ‘poor’ or ‘not poor’ but are 
able to see poverty as a matter of degree.  Thus, we can calculate a mean to 
compare average poverty rates between any two or more countries, provinces, or 
                                                     
28  Round 2 of the Afrobarometer, to be conducted in fifteen countries between July 
2002 and June 2003, will use a five-point response category scale with these items. 
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other groups of households or individuals – something that is not possible with 





Sometimes income or expenditure data is used simply to sort respondents or 
households into country-specific deciles or quintiles, yet this limits our ability to 
make direct cross-national comparisons of quintiles or deciles because the 
categories are country relative.   Alternately, if income and expenditure is 
converted to an internationally comparable money metric, such as U.S. dollars, 
researchers are forced to estimate values of things like bags of flour, land or 
livestock.  As discussed above, poverty line estimates also forced researchers to 
estimate what it costs to ‘get by’ in a given country.   In contrast, the LPI 
provides an absolute scale whose meaning is not relative or contextual.  
Moreover, respondents tell us whether or not they ‘get by,’ we do not have to 
infer it by comparing income or expenditure to a poverty line.  Responses 
summarize the consequences of income and access to services; they obviate the 
need to make statistical adjustments to income for things like regional 
differences in cost of living, differential access to public goods, household size; 
or to attach monetary values to publicly-provided goods, production for own use 
or in-kind transactions. 
 
Critics might argue that cross-national or cross-cultural comparisons of LPI 
results are equally invalid since what constitutes ‘enough’ food or water to, for 
example, a middle-class white South African may be very different to that for a 
rural Zambian.  In other words, wealthier people might adjust and expand their 
definition of what constitutes sufficient food, water or necessary medical 
treatment.  However, an examination of the responses of the relatively wealthy 
countries and relatively wealthy respondents reveals that they respond as we 
would expect and generally say they ‘never’ go without these things.  The 
substantial racial differences within South Africa suggest that wealthier people 
do not appear to ‘raise the bar’ or ‘move the goalposts’ and that responses reflect 
absolute rather than relative need:  Indeed, the validity and reliability measures 
of the scale demonstrate that people across nations and across cultures are 
reacting to these things in similar ways. 
 
Ease of Measurement 
 
As we have seen, collecting valid and reliable income and expenditure data 
entails significant costs in both money and interview time.  It is expensive in 
terms of money largely because economists want to maintain the fine 
distinctions enabled by money based data even within small sub-groups: for 
example, they may want to examine differences in income by age among men 
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versus women within a specific province.  This requires relatively large samples 
of desired sub groups, and often means national samples of 10,000 households 
or more.  The exhaustive questioning needed to track all sources of income, all 
forms of expenditure and all household assets also means a very long survey that 
increases labour costs.  Such surveys are expensive in terms of interview space 
because the exhaustive tracking leaves little room for questions on other 
subjects.  This makes the measurement of ‘income poverty’ prohibitive for 
sample-based surveys on other subjects who want to measure poverty merely as 
one explanatory variable among others.   
 
The LPI cannot substitute for the detailed mapping provided by dedicated 
survey and poverty researchers will certainly want to continue to use Censuses 
and dedicated Living Standards Measures Surveys or Income and Expenditure 
Surveys for periodic in-depth investigations.  But given the long time spans 
between national censuses, the prohibitive costs of LSMS’s or IES’s, and the 
limited resources of national statistical offices, the LPI has much to offer.  It is 
‘cheap’ in terms of question space, and can be used far more frequently with 
relatively small samples to obtain regular ‘readings’ of national or provincial 
poverty lines, to monitor changes in specific facets like the increase in hunger 
during a drought or famine.  
 
 
Comparing Alternative Poverty Indices 
 
If the Afrobarometer Lived Poverty Index offers an arguably more conceptually 
valid indicator of everyday lived poverty, how does it perform empirically?  We 
have already seen that responses to the seven questions constitute a reliable and 
valid scale that is distinct from other measures of well being.  In this section, we 
compare aggregate results produced by the Afrobarometer index with poverty 
measures produced by other types of data.   
 
 
National Mean Scores 
 
The first line of comparison is to take the ordinal country rankings and national 
mean scores produced by the LPI and compare them with the country rankings 
and national mean scores produced by measures created by the World Bank and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for the same seven 
countries (see Table 27).  The Bank produces two purely money metric-based 
indicators, GNP per capita and GNP adjusted for purchasing power parity (GNP 
PPP); both of these are gathered from national accounts data.  They also 
generate two indicators based on health data that measure average Infant 
Mortality and Under Five Mortality.  The UNDP’s Human Development Index 
(HDI) is an average index measure that summarises average life expectancy at 
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birth, adult literacy, the school enrolment, and adjusted per capita income in 
PPP$ (UNDP, 1999:127).  Looking back to the previous discussion, the World 
Bank’s money-metric indicators are measures of the antecedents of poverty, 
while its life expectancy indicators would measure its consequences.  The HDI 
combines measure of antecedents and consequences.   
 
A visual inspection of the results shows that all five indices place either South 
Africa or Botswana as the least impoverished country in the region.  The 
Afrobarometer places Lesotho as the most impoverished, but the other four 
consistently rank Malawi as the most impoverished.  All five agree that Zambia 
is the second most impoverished country.  The relative ranking of Malawi and 
Lesotho seem to be the major sources of discordance.  In terms of human 
development and money metric indicators, Lesotho should be relatively 
prosperous compared to Zambia and Malawi.  This reflects the paradox painted 
by the authors of the recent Lesotho poverty study that we discussed earlier 
(Gay and Hall, 2000).  In contrast, Malawi is consistently seen as the most 
impoverished country in the region by the other indices; yet in 1999-2000 
Malawians were far less likely than Zambians and Basotho to say they 
frequently go without basic necessities.   
 
Table 28 reports both Pearson’s r product-moment coefficients (which reflect 
correlations of stepwise changes in absolute poverty estimates across two 
countries) and Kendall’s Tau B coefficients (which reflect the consistency of 
relative country rankings). In terms of relative country rankings, the AB index 
correlates rather strongly, though far from perfectly, with the alternative poverty 
measures. Figure 2 reflects the discordance over the ranking of Botswana and 
south Africa, and Malawi and Lesotho. 
 
However, what is not immediately apparent from Table 28 or Figure 2 is that 
changes in the absolute magnitude of poverty as estimated by the LPI correlate 
extremely strongly with changes as measured by the two World Bank money-
metric indices: in fact, there is an almost linear relationship between the AB 
Index and GNP Per Capita (r = -.93).  It correlates at a slightly lower level with 
GNP adjusted for purchasing power parity (-.84).  In contrast, the AB Index has 





A second line of comparison is to use the Poverty Line approach whereby an 
amount is calculated (usually based on estimated costs of a basket of basic 
necessities) and then the proportion of people who live under that line is used as 
the poverty estimate for a given country.   As noted earlier, one of the 
advantages of this approach is that it provides us with a gross estimate, or 
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‘headcount’ of the actual number of people living in poverty.  Yet its drawback 
is that it forces the analyst to define the precise line between being poor and not 
being poor, a line that may often be arbitrary.  
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7 Malawi  
(.388) 
 
* World Bank, 2001: 274. 
** World Bank 2001: 276.  
*** Taylor, 2000: 53. 
 
Table 28:  Correlations of the AB Average Lived Poverty Index and Other 
Indices 
 


























In order to draw alternative ‘poverty lines’ in the responses to the Afrobarometer 
items, we first calculated the average proportion who said they ‘often’ went 
without across the seven basic necessities (which could be seen as a measure of 
the most destitute), as well as the average proportions that went without ‘often’ 
and ‘sometimes’ (the destitute and the poor).  We also calculated the proportion 
of respondents whose average score on the four-point scale is above 2.5.  We 
then compared the national estimates produces by these three ‘poverty lines’ 
with: (1) a World Bank International Poverty Line indicator that uses data 
gathered from national household surveys to calculate the proportions with an 
income of at less than US $1 a day at purchasing power parity; (2) a UNDP 
National Poverty Line indicator that measures the proportions living below 
nationally defined poverty lines; and (3) the UNDP’s Human Poverty Index 
which measures the percentage of people not expected to survive to age 40, the 
percentage of illiterate adults, the percentage of people without access to safe 
water and health services, and the percentage of underweight children under 
five. These are reported in Table 29. 
 
First of all, we can see the large effect of relatively minor decisions over 
whether to define poverty in the LPI as only the most destitute, or the destitute 
Figure 2
AB Lived Poverty Index by GNP Per Capita
































and the poor.  With the exception of Zimbabwe and Lesotho, every country is 
placed at a different ranking by the two indicators.  Secondly, the LPI-based 
poverty line indices show more dissonance with other rankings than was the 
case with the national mean scores.  
 
An examination of the correlations reaffirms the last point: the LPI correlates at 
far weaker levels with other ‘poverty line’ measures than with regard to national 
mean averages (see Table 30).  But even within the poverty line approach, we 
again see that the LPI correlates most strongly with a money-metric measure 
(those living on less that US1$ a day) than with an outcomes-based approach.  
One reason that these correlations are weaker than with GNP per capita may be 
that they were gathered via income and expenditure household surveys that face 
the problems discussed previously of accurately measuring income or 
calculating money values for household assets.   
 
 
Intra-National Indicators (South Africa) 
 
A third possible line of comparison based on available data is to examine 
various permutations of the Afrobarometer LPI measures with available South 
African data aggregated by province.  Table 31 shows Afrobarometer Index 
results for each South African province calculated as a mean score, or as the 
percentages living under three different possible poverty lines.  The rank-
ordering of the provinces generally accords with common understandings of the 
national distribution of poverty, with Western Cape and Gauteng as the 
wealthiest provinces, and Eastern Cape, Limpopo (formerly Northern Province) 
and Mpumalanga as the poorest.  
 
Tables 32 and 33 display several indices generated by Statistics South Africa 
based on a ‘poverty line’ approach (Hirschowitz et al, 2000: 66).  The indices in 
Table 32 display the percentages of people in each province who live in 
households with a per capita income or expenditure of less than R2500 per 
month or R800 per month using, alternatively, the 1996 Census, the 1995 
National Income and Expenditure Survey, or calculations based on the 1995 IES 
survey to impute values to all census households.  The last two columns display 
Stats SA’s calculations of the proportion of ‘poor’ and ‘very poor’ households in 
each province using calculations from the IES to impute values to census 
households.  
 
Table 33 displays a Household Infrastructure Index that is based on eight 
separate measures of household access to services, and a Household 
Circumstances Index, which is based on three measures of household 
employment and composition.    
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Table 29:  Alternative ‘Poverty Line’ Based Rankings 
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* Botswana data from 1985-1986, Zimbabwe data from 1990-1991, and South Africa, 
Namibia and Lesotho data from 1993. World Bank, 2001: 290. Malawi figure from period 
1989-1994. UNDP, 2000: 147. 
**  UNDP, 1999: 147.  
*** UNDP, 1999: 127; data taken from Taylor, 2000: 61.  
 
Table 30: Correlations of Poverty Line Indices 
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Poverty Line 
(Percent With Average 
Score > 2.5 on Scale of 1 
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(Average Percent ‘Often / 


























Pearson’s r correlation coefficients 
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(Mean Score On Scale 
of 1 to 4, 2000)  
AB LPI 
Poverty Line (Average 
Percent ‘Often’ Going 




‘Often / ‘Sometimes’ 




Average Score > 2.5 
On Scale of 1 to 4, 
2000) 
1 W Cape 
(1.6) 
1 W Cape  
(5%) 
 W Cape (21%)  W Cape 
(12%) 
 N Cape 
(1.7) 
 Gauteng  
(7%) 






 N Cape  
(10%) 
 Gauteng (27%)  N Cape 
(17%) 
 Free State 
(2.0) 
 Free State 
(10%) 
 N West  
(34%) 
 Free State 
(23%) 
 N West 
(2.0) 
 N West  
(12%) 
 KZ Natal 
(38%) 
 N West 
(25%) 
6 KZ Natal 
(2.1) 
 KZ Natal (13%)  Free State 
(38%) 




 Mpuma  
(14%) 




8 E Cape 
(2.3) 
 E Cape  
(17%) 
 E Cape  
(48%) 




 Limpopo (24%)  Limpopo (51%)  Limpopo 
(46%) 
 
Various derivations of the Afrobarometer LPI correlate very strongly with 
alternative Stats SA measures (Table 34).  The two strongest correlations are 
between (1) the AB LPI Poverty Line (Average Scores >2.5) and the Stats SA 
Household Circumstances Index that measures household employment, 
household size, and the number of children under 5; and (2) between the LPI 
Poverty Line (Average Percent ‘often/sometimes’ going without) and the 
percent in households with per capita monthly incomes under R800 (r = .93, for 
both).  Looking across all correlations, the strongest consistent correlations are 
between the LPI estimate of those who ‘often/sometimes’ go without on the one 
hand, and the Stats SA measures of actual income and Household Circumstances 
and Household Infrastructure Indices on the other.   All variants of the LPI 
correlate most weakly with expenditure data, and imputed data. 
 
Finally, we examine the same data broken down by apartheid categories (Table 
35).  We see that the AB Poverty Index aggregated by racial group correlates 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































White and Indian South Africans experience the lowest levels of poverty, with 
higher levels of impoverishment among coloured respondents and the greatest 
levels of poverty among black South Africans (Table 36). 
 
 
Table 33: Alternative South African Money Based Provincial Poverty 
Rankings (Stats SA) 
 
Stats SA  
Household Infrastructure Index29
Stats SA 
Household Circumstances Index30  
1 Western Cape 
(8) 
1 Western Cape 
(3) 




3 Northern Cape 
(14) 
3 Free State 
(5) 
4 KwaZulu Natal  
(17) 
4 Northern Cape 
(6) 
 Free State  
(17) 
 North West 
(6) 




7 North West  
(23) 
7 KwaZulu Natal 
(8) 




9 Eastern Cape  
(24) 
 Eastern Cape 
(9) 
Because items had different measurement ranges, provincial totals were created and then divided into 
thirds.  If a province fell into the top third, it received a score of one on the item, two if it fell into the 
middle third, and three if it fell into the lowest third.  The Household Infrastructure Index consists of 
eight measures, thus the top score is 8 and the worst is 24.  The Household Circumstances Index 
consists of three, thus the top score is 3 and the worst is 9. 
 
                                                     
29  The Household Infrastructure Index and the Household Circumstances Indices were 
created by factor analyzing 11 items from the 1996 Census that yielded two principal 
components.  The Household Infrastructure Index comprises 7 items that measuring whether 
one lived in a formal house, had access to electricity for lighting, an inside water tap, a flush 
or chemical toilet, a telephone or cellular phone in the house, weekly refuse removal, level of 
education of head of household, and monthly household expenditure.  See Hirschowitz et al, 
2000: 76-77. 
30  The Household Circumstanced Index comprises items measuring whether one was 
employed (using the broad definition), average household size, and the number of children 
under five years of age.  Hirschowitz et al, 2000: 76 and 79. 
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Table 34: Correlations between Alternative South African Provincial 
Level Poverty Indicators 
 
  Average Percent Who 
‘Often’ / ‘Sometimes’ 










Above 2.5, 2000 
(Afrobarometer) 
Average Percent 
Who ‘Often’ Go 
Without 7 Basic 
Necessities, 2000 
(Afrobarometer) 
Percent in Households 
Per Capita Monthly 
Income <R800 




.884** .883** .932*** .906*** 
Percent in Households 
Per Capita Monthly 
Income <R250 




.855** .856** .843** .819** 
Percent in Households 
Per Capita Monthly 
Imputed Expenditure 
<R250 
.787* .718* .722* .718* 
Percent in Households 
Per Capita Monthly 
Expenditure <R250 
.719* .668* .666* .649 
Percent ‘Very Poor’ 
And ‘Poor’ Households 
Imputed Monthly 
Expenditure <R1000  
.718* .630 .619 .597 
Percent in Households 
Per Capita Monthly 
Imputed Expenditure 
<R800 
.647 .547 .531 .534 
Percent in Households 
Per Capita Monthly 
Expenditure <R800  
.568 .464 .439 .466 




.459 .344 .310 .261 
* sig = .05 
** sig = .01 
*** sig = .001 
 
54 




AB Index  
(%Above 2.5 On 
Scale of 1 to 4) 
1996 Census 




based on 1995 IES)* 
1996 Census 





































* Hirschowitz et al, 2000: 59-60. 
 
 
Table 36: Correlation between Alternative South African Racial Poverty 
Indicators 
 
  Mean Lived Poverty Score, 
2000 (Afrobarometer) 
Percent With Mean Poverty 
Score Below 2.5, 2000 
(Afrobarometer) 
Percent ‘Very Poor’ 
Households 
Imputed Monthly Expenditure  
< R600) 
.991** .971* 
Percent ‘Very Poor’ and ‘Poor’  
Households – Imputed Monthly 






Thus, a variety of permutations of the Afrobarometer Lived Poverty Index 
correlate at very high levels with alternative measures of poverty.  This suggests 
some degree of robustness.   In general, it appears that lived poverty reflects 
most strongly cross-national, cross-provincial and cross-racial money-metric 
differences, whether the data is based on national accounts or household 
surveys.   In contrast, lived poverty shows much weaker linkages with measures 
of expenditure, and of outcomes such as education, literacy or health. 
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Figure 3: Aggregate Level Linkages with Poverty 
 
Antecedents    Poverty     Consequences 
 
            Under 5 Mortality 
 
        .59   
 
           
GNP Per Capita     -.93  Lived Poverty  .63    Infant Mortality 
    (Going Without Basic Necessities)   
 
        .55  
           Human Development 
                (Long, Healthy, Informed Lives) 
 
 
Individual Level Determinants of Lived Poverty 
 
We have presented both logical argument and empirical evidence that the 
Afrobarometer Index provides a valid, reliable and apparently robust measure of 
poverty.   We now turn to examine the individual level correlates and predictors 
of lived poverty.  Which of the various quality of life factors measured by the 
Afrobarometer shape the extent to which people enjoy the basic necessities of 
life?  We conducted a multivariate regression analysis of the determinants -- or 
predictors -- of lived poverty across the region.  Multiple regression is a tool that 
helps assess the correlation of a set of independent variables on a dependent 
variable (in this case, poverty).  It enables us to determine how well the entire 
set of predictor variables correlates with the dependent variables.  It also 
identifies the correlation between a specific independent variable and the 
dependent variable controlling for the simultaneous correlation of that variable 
with all the other independent variables. 
 
We tested five gradually expanding models (see Table 37).  The first is a purely 
structural model that tests the impact of age, gender and urban/rural location and 
accounts for just ten percent of the variance in personal poverty levels.  The 
second model adds the two measures of employment status and formal 
education, increasing Adjusted R2 to .17.  The third model adds the measures of 
occupational class discussed earlier, using dummy variables for middle class, 
working class, agricultural / subsistence labour, and those who have never been 
employed (with housewives, students, retired people as the reference group).  
However, these variables add just one percentage point in explanatory power.  
The fourth model adds the indicators of development infrastructure, community 
services, agricultural activity and access to schools, which enable us to account 
for over one quarter (28 percent) of variation in individual poverty.  Finally, we 
56 
add measures of race and national citizenship that increases explained variance 
to 34 percent.   
 
There are several important things to note in this series of models.  The first is 
the changing impact of urban/rural location.  Bivariate analysis demonstrates 
that there is a strong urban bias to poverty and development in Southern Africa.  
People who live in urban areas are less likely to go without basic necessities,31 
and more likely to have gone farther in the educational system.32  Urban areas 
are also much more likely to have been the beneficiaries of state and/or donor 
financed projects to build development infrastructure (such as electricity, water, 
sewerage, and clinics),33 and to have more extensive community services (such 
as transportation service, civic facilities, and places to shop).34  And, as reflected 
in Table 37, rural-urban location does play a strong role in shaping poverty 
when placed into the analysis along with age and gender.  But once variables 
such as education, employment status are introduced into the analysis, the 
impact of rural-urban location becomes extremely small, and then completely 
disappears once racial and national differences are introduced.  
 
Secondly, controlling for all factors simultaneously, the most important 
determinants of lived poverty are the existence of development infrastructure in 
the immediate area around the respondent, and individual educational 
attainment.  In other words, within each country and race group, within both 
rural or urban populations, and at equal levels of employment, the more 
governments have built electricity and water grids, sewerage systems, health 
clinics and paved streets, etc. in the immediate surrounding area, and the farther 
you have advanced through the educational system, the less likely you are to live 
in poverty.  Not having a job, now or at any point in the past year, is also 
strongly associated with lower levels of poverty (underlining the lack of state 
unemployment benefits across the region except in South Africa, and the very 
limited impact of these benefits in keeping the unemployed out of poverty). 
 
Thirdly, social or occupational class plays almost no role in distinguishing 
between degrees of lived poverty.  Compared to housewives, senior citizens and 
students (the excluded category), Africans who belong to the middle class, 
working class, or peasantry are no less or more impoverished.  Only the hard-
core unemployed, those who have never worked, encounter significantly higher 
degrees of poverty.   In general, once we control for education, employment and 
rural-urban status, poverty appears to cut across occupational class in Southern 
Africa.   
                                                     
31  Pearson’s r = -.31, sig = .000, n = 8422. 
32  Pearson’s r = .35, sig. = .000, n = 8949. 
33  Pearson’s r = .69, sig. = .000, n = 8402. 




Fourthly, the regression analysis also reveals that even at equal levels of 
education, employment or rural-urban status, there are still significant cross-
national differences and racial differences in lived poverty.  Controlling for 
differential education or employment opportunities does not make the impact of 
race or national citizenship disappear.  We determined this by entering a series 
of dummy variables.  Dummy variables take the value of 1 if a respondent 
belongs to a specific category and 0 if not); one of the categories is always 
omitted because it is implicitly captured when all the other categories equal 
zero.  For example, if the coloured, Indian and white dummy variables all equal 
zero then the impact of the variables for black respondents is implicitly captured 
by the equation without having to enter a specific variable for being black.  The 
excluded category then serves as a reference group that allows comparisons 
among the groups.   
 
We entered dummy variables for coloured, Indian and white categories (with 
black being the implicit reference group), and one for each country except South 
Africa which then served as the reference group. 35  What the results tell us is 
that compared to black respondents across the region, being white, coloured or 
Indian is associated with sharply-reduced levels of poverty, largely reflecting the 
legacies of legally-enforced racial discrimination in South Africa, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe.  Compared to South Africans, being a resident of Botswana and 
Malawi is associated with a reduction in poverty (again, after controlling for 
factors like education, employment or rural/urban status).  However, being from 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and Lesotho is associated with an increase in poverty 
compared to South Africa. We do not maintain that there is some something 
essential or genetic to race or to national culture that accounts for these results. 
Rather, we see race and country as summary, proxy measures of a variety of 
differing socialisation and historical experiences, as well as current perceptions 
of how these differing interests are affected by economic trends and government 
performance (Bratton and Mattes, 2003 forthcoming).  
 
                                                     
35  We tested this be entering a series of dummy variables measuring race (with black 
as the excluded group for comparison) and country (with South Africa as the excluded group).  
Decisions over which category of a discrete variable to exclude from the series of dummy 
variables are arbitrary.  We used the criteria of excluding the category represented by the most 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Survival in Southern Africa 
 
We have witnessed a fairly depressing picture of poverty across Southern 
Africa.  How then do people survive?  In this section we report the result of a 
unique set of questions, asked in Afrobarometer surveys in Southern Africa, that 
measure what social scientists call ‘social capital’.   We adopt Richard Rose’s 
(1998: 5) definition of social capital as a stock of informal social networks or 
formal organisations used by people to produce goods and services.  It is the 
way that people ‘get things done’.  And because ‘getting things done’ in 
Southern Africa often amounts to no more than simple day-to-day survival, 
these questions can also be said to measure people’s ‘survival strategies’.  
 
These questions focus on survival strategies in four key domains of life: (1) food 
and sustenance; (2) physical security; (3) income; and (4) health.  Within each 
domain, we asked people how they obtain these goods on a normal basis 
(‘Describe the things you currently do to obtain ____.  Is there anything else?’)   
But because social capital also encompasses people’s overall stock of strategies, 
existing and potential, we also asked people what they would do if they could no 
longer obtain these things through their existing strategies (If you could no 
longer get ____ in this way, what other methods would you use?  Is there 
anything else?).  Because these questions were asked in a slightly different way 
in Namibia, this section only reports responses from six countries.   
 
We begin this section by describing the frequencies with which people use 
different types of survival strategies.   All responses were recorded verbatim but 
later classified into broader categories to aid with analysis.  At its broadest, 
people’s survival strategies could be classified into at least six types of 
strategies.  First of all, southern Africans use market strategies to obtain things 
such as food and income, but even security and health care.  A market strategy is 
anything that involves an exchange of money, services, labour or any other in-
kind payment or barter in return for goods.  When they lack the cash or other 
resources to exchange for these goods, Southern Africans may turn to their 
family and friends for support, or look to some other form of social cooperation 
with neighbours, for example, in a rotating credit association.   In some 
instances, they may turn to the state for help, or they may simply fall back on 
self-reliance and produce the goods themselves.  Others may be so desperate 
that they have no choice but to beg, or ask anyone they can for sustenance and 
support.   
 
Then we move to discuss the extent of Southern Africans’ strategies, or what 
might be called the breadth of their survival repertoire.   Here we simply 
examine how many different existing or ‘back-up’ strategies people may count 
on to help them ‘get by’.  If people have no alternative back-up strategies, we 
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consider them to be vulnerable to some shock, such as a drastic jump in prices 
or drought.  If they can list no existing strategy, we label them as helpless.   A 
broader repertoire of strategies might reflect a personal resourcefulness that 
helps people keep out of poverty and destitution, or it may simply reflect access 
to resources.  Thus, we end with an analysis of the factors that distinguish those 
with broader and narrower repertoires of action, as well as distinguish those who 




We began by asking people to: ‘Describe the things you currently do to provide 
food for yourself or your family?  Is there anything else?’  Interviewers accepted 
up to four answers.  This was followed up by the question: ‘If you could no 
longer get food in this way, what other methods would by most likely to use?  Is 
there anything else?’  Interviewers recorded up to three different answers and 
wrote down verbatim the responses to each question.  We later recoded the 
responses into broader categories for analysis.  
 
Perhaps in contrast to the popular image of the self-sufficient peasant, only 
about one in three Southern Africans consume food they grow themselves as a 
main part of their monthly food supply (see Table 38).  However there is a wide 
variance from the three quarters of Malawians (77 percent) and six in ten 
Basotho (62 percent) to the one in ten Batswana (14 percent) and one in twenty 
South Africans (4 percent) who grow their own food.   From September 1999 to 
the end of August 2000, the vast majority of Southern Africans used market 
strategies to obtain their food, meaning that they either bought it or obtained it 
by exchanging goods and services in kind.  At least one half of every national 
sample said this was at least one of their primary methods of getting food.  It 
was the modal response in every country except Malawi.   
 
Family networks are an important source of food for about one in five Southern 
Africans.  Again, there is a wide cross-country variation with 43 percent of 
South Africans saying they get food through family and friends but less than one 
in ten in Zambia (8 percent), Lesotho (7 percent) and Malawi (3 percent).  
Notably, only around one in twenty people across the region listed government 
or the state as a current source of their food supply, with a high of one in ten 
South Africans (9 percent) suggesting the existence of at least some state 
welfare capabilities in that country.  Finally, approximately 1 percent is helpless 
in that they report having no present strategy for securing the food they and their 
family eat each month.  
 
When we ask people about their ‘backup’ strategies for obtaining food, about 
one in three across the region are vulnerable to shock in that they have no 
immediate back up strategy should their present means of getting food fail them 
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(which in this case largely consists of depending on the market to deliver their 
food) (see Table 39).  However, there are huge differences, ranging from 70 
percent of Basotho who say they have no alternative strategies if their present 
sources of food failed to just 2 percent of Batswana.  However, fully four in ten 
Batswana (43 percent) say they would turn to begging and thus may also be 
classified as vulnerable.  South Africans, on the other hand, are most likely to 
say they would use a different market strategy, such as performing services in 
kind.   
 
Less than one in ten say they would turn to growing their own food in such a 
circumstance, ranging from 15 percent in Zambia to only 4 percent of South 
Africans.  Less than one in ten see the state as a feeder of last resort, ranging 
from a high of 9 percent in Zimbabwe to just 1 percent of Malawians.  Only in 
Botswana and South Africa do as many as one in ten feel they could turn to their 
family or friends.  This suggests that most people feel that if they were facing a 
food crisis, neighbours, friends and families would be in the same position, thus 
eliminating them as potential suppliers.  These data shed important light on the 
famine that has spread across Southern Africa in 2002.  If drought cuts down 
their own production and that same drought – together with economic 
mismanagement – seriously diminishes what is available in the marketplace, 






When it comes to securing their homes, most people either depend on 
themselves or are helpless (see Table 40).  Thus, the most important finding 
from this set of questions may be how infrequently Southern Africans conceive 
of the police as a part of their home security framework.  At most, one in ten 
South Africans (12 percent) and Zimbabweans (12 percent) see the police as 
prime actors in keeping their homes safe.   One might say that this is 
understandable since most people secure their houses on an everyday basis on 
their own and only turn to the police when their methods have failed and the 
houses have been broken into.  But even when we turn to backup strategies, no 
more than one in ten people in South Africa (11 percent) and Botswana (10 
percent) and fewer elsewhere say they would turn to the police if their existing 




Table 38: Existing Food Survival Strategies 
 Botswana Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe Lesotho South 
Africa 
Market Strategy 67 70 65 63 73 66 
Grow or Collect Food 14 77 49 45 62 4 
From Family and 
Friends 
28 3 8 13 7 43 
From the State 7 1 1 2 1 9 
Through Social  
Cooperation 
3 1 1 10 4 5 
Begging / Borrowing 4 2 1 1 2 3 
Helpless  1 1 1 3 <1 1 
Stealing <1 0 <1 <1 <1 1 
Through Corrupt 
Means 
<1 0 <1 <1 1 <1 
From traditional 
leaders 
0 <1 0 <1 0 0 
Through Dishonest 
Means 
0 <1 0 <1 0 0 
Eat From Hand to 
Mouth 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
From Community 
Leaders 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other Methods 0 0 2 <1 <1 4 
 
Table 39: Backup Food Strategies 
  Botswana Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe Lesotho South 
Africa 
No Alternative 2 46 56 51 70 11 
Market  20 30 19 17 12 46 
Beg / Ask Anyone I 
Can 
43 16 3 3 3 9 
Grow or Collect 
Own Food 
12 7 15 11 7 4 
Family and Friends 12 1 4 9 2 14 
State 8 3 1 9 1 6 
Social Cooperation 2 1 2 5 3 7 
Corruption  1 1 <1 1 1 <0 
Dishonest Means 0 <1 0 <1 0 0 
Stealing 2 <1 1 1 1 4 
Traditional Leaders <1 0 0 <1 0 0 




In contrast, self-help is the modal response in every country except in Lesotho.  
Nine in ten Malawians (87 percent) compared to just one in five Basotho (22 
percent) do so (and in that country, the most frequent answer is helplessness).  
One in ten look to their families (often merely leaving someone at home at all 
times to watch the house), and one in twenty rely on their neighbours to keep an 
eye on their houses.  Eight percent of South Africans are able to buy their way 
out of insecurity, principally through professional security firms.  Across the 
region, fully one in five are ‘helpless’ with no particular strategy, with as many 
as 50 percent in Lesotho.  In every country except South Africa, the largest 
percentages of people are vulnerable, meaning that they cannot conceive of any 
alternative way to protect their homes.    
 
Table 40: Existing Methods of Home Security  
 
 Botswana Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe Lesotho South Africa
Self reliance 48 87 47 70 22 71 
Helpless 40 10 18 16 49 12 
Social cooperation 3 6 5 12 8 12 
From state 6 2 7 9 11 12 
Family and friends 4 <1 1 7 1 7 
Market related 
strategy 
4 2 3 4 <1 8 
Other methods 1 0 1 <1 <1 8 
Traditional leaders <1 1 <1 2 12 <1 
Begging or asking 
anyone 
<1 <1 0 <1 2 0 
Corruption <1 0 1 1 0 0 
Stealing it <1 0 0 0 0 <1 
Dishonest methods <1 <1 <1 <1 0 0 
Community 
Leaders 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 41: Alternative Security Strategies 
 
 Botswana Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe Lesotho South Africa
No alternative  
/helpless 
48 48 71 63 67 14 
Self Reliance  9 29 19 17 7 35 
The State 10 3 1 6 5 11 
Other Strategies 5 <1 1 3 2 17 
Social Cooperation 5 3 3 5 2 9 
Market  4 6 3 3 <1 12 
Family and Friends 1 <1 <1 3 0 2 
Begging <1 2 <1 <1 2 <1 
Traditional leaders 1 4 <1 1 2 <1 
Corrupt Means 2 <1 <1 <1 <1 0 
Dishonest Means <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 0 





Not surprisingly, market exchanges are the chief means by which Southern 
Africans obtain cash income, primarily by exchanging labour or some other 
form of service for cash (see Table 42).  It is the modal response in every 
country.  The second most frequently cited strategy is to get cash from friends 
and families, which as many as one third of South Africans (35 percent) and 
Batswana (34 percent) depend on, as well as a quarter of Basotho (27 percent), 
and one fifth of Zimbabweans.  Again, few people rely on the state as a primary 
provider of cash, underlining the virtually non-existent state welfare systems 
across the region.    
 
While just one in twenty can be classified as helpless, claiming no present 
strategy for obtaining cash, approximately four in ten Southern Africans are 
vulnerable to a loss of their primary cash provider, with as many as six in ten 
Zambians (60 percent), Basotho (59 percent) and Zimbabweans (57 percent) 
with no alternative methods of obtaining cash if the economy fails and they lose 
their jobs (see Table 43).  Interestingly, friends and families are not a popular 
source of backup funds during a crisis.  At most one in ten South Africans (12 
percent) and Batswana (9 percent) could look in this direction.    
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Table 42: Existing Strategies to Obtain a Cash Income 
 
  Botswana Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe Lesotho South Africa
Market Strategy 67 76 77 69 67 64 
Family and friends 34 15 12 21 27 35 
Helpless 4 <1 3 5 5 6 
Self Reliance 3 27 13 16 2 1 
Other Methods .3 <1 3 <1 0 6 
Obtain Cash from  
State 
2 <1 <1 0 <1 2 
Social Cooperation 5 1 1 1 1 4 
Begging or asking  
Anyone 
2 1 <1 1 <1 <1 
Corruption <1 0 0 <1 0 1 
Obtain Cash by  
Stealing it 
<1 0 0 <1 1 <1 
Obtain Cash from  
Traditional Leaders 
0 <1 0 <1 1 <1 
Dishonest Methods <1 0 0 <1 0 0 
 
 
Table 43: Alternative Cash Strategies 
 
 Botswana Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe Lesotho South Africa
No alternative  
strategy 
38 47 60 57 59 15 
Market strategy 32 42 27 24 27 47 
Other Strategies 5 <1 2 3 2 18 
Family and friends 9 2 5 5 2 12 
Beg, Ask Anyone 3 5 1 2 1 3 
Self Reliance  3 6 2 3 2 2 
State 3 0 0 0 0 3 
Stealing 1 <1 <1 <1 1 3 
Community leaders 0 000 0 0 0 0 
Corrupt means <1 0 <1 2 <1 1 
Social cooperation 1 <1 1 2 <1 1 
Dishonest means 0 <1 0 <1 0 0 






Health care is the only one of the four areas examined where people see the state 
as a major provider (Table 44).  Almost two-thirds of respondents across the 
region say they use government clinics and hospitals or get drugs from 
government pharmacies and dispensaries.  It is the modal response in every 
country.  Approximately four in ten use market strategies, pay for medicine and 
visits to doctors, or receive it as part of their jobs, ranging from a high of 56 
percent in South Africa to just 6 percent in Lesotho.  Traditional healers are 
used by around one in ten respondents ranging from a high of one in four in 
Malawi (24 percent) and Lesotho (23 percent) to 9 percent in South Africa and 8 
percent in Zimbabwe. 
 
Just 4 percent are helpless with no existing strategy to secure medicine or 
medical treatment.  However, four in ten (39 percent) can be classified as 
vulnerable, saying they would have no place to turn to if their present methods 
failed (Table 45).  This includes two thirds of Basotho (66 percent) and 
approximately one half of Zambians (56 percent), Zimbabweans (54 percent), 
Malawians (50 percent) or Batswana (46 percent).  The most popular backup 
strategies are either to turn to the market or to traditional healers.  The 
proportions willing to turn to traditional healers range from one quarter of 
Malawians (24 percent) and Basotho (23 percent) and one fifth of Zambians (19 
percent) to one in ten South Africans (9 percent).  Slightly less than one quarter 
of South Africans (22 percent) would resort to a market strategy if their existing 
methods failed, but slightly more than a quarter (29 percent) would expect to be 
able to turn to the state. 
 
Table 44: Existing Health Care Survival Strategies 
 
 Botswana Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe Lesotho South 
Africa 
The state 93 89 63 52 91 63 
Market related  
strategy 
14 18 39 32 6 56 
Traditional 
leaders 
11 24 19 8 23 9 
Self reliance 5 10 8 21 <1 10 
Helpless  6 3 6 6 6 4 
Other methods  <1 1 <1 <1 4 
Family and 
Friends 
<1 0 2 4 <1 1 
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Table 44 continued 
 




<1 <1 <1 <1 0 <1 
Corruption <1 <1 <1 1 <1 <1 
Social cooperation 2 <1 <1 <1 <1 1 
Begging or asking 
anyone 
<1 <1 <1 <1 0 <1 
Dishonest 
methods 
0 0 0 <1 0 0 
Stealing it <1 0 <1 0 0 0 
 
Table 45: Alternative Health Strategies 
 
 Botswana Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe Lesotho South 
Africa 
No alternative /  
helpless 
46 50 56 54 66 18 
Traditional 
healers 
28 30 28 14 18 21 
Market strategy 9 5 11 10 4 22 
The state 4 17 3 13 7 29 
Self Reliance  2 1 1 4 <1 4 
Family and 
friends 
1 <1 1 3 0 4 
Community 
leaders 
3 <1 <1 6 <1 <1 
Social cooperation 5 1 1 <1 <1 1 
Stealing <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 
Corrupt means <1 0 <1 1 <1 <1 
Begging <1 0 <1 <1 1 <1 
Dishonest means 0 0 0 <1 0 0 
 
 
The Sources of Social Capital 
 
What shapes Southern Africans’ social capital networks? Are there any patterns 
to the frequency with which people resort to various strategies across or within 
specific situations, or domains?  Are there any consistent reasons why some 
people use certain strategies and some use others, or why some people have 
recourse to a broader repertoire of strategies and others do not?   
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Drawing on prominent theories of social capital, Rose (1998: 5-9) has deduced 
three competing predictions about the sources of social capital.  One approach, 
contained in Frances Fukuyama’s (1995) analysis of the relationship of trust and 
prosperity, sees social capital as a set of norms (rather than networks) that 
permit cooperation.  On this view, patterns of norms are primarily a function of 
national cultural differences.  Thus, patterns of social capital in our data should 
be consistent across situations or domains and within societies, but differ across 
countries.  Alternatively, Ronald Inglehart (1997, cited in Rose, 1998: 8) sees 
social capital as a ‘culture of trust and tolerance in which extensive networks of 
voluntary associations emerge’. Social networks are a consequence of social 
trust.  Incidentally, Rose cites Inglehart as the source of this hypothesis rather 
than the more well known formulation of Robert Putnam because Putnam’s 
definition of social capital as ‘features of social life—networks, norms and 
trust—that facilitate cooperation and coordination for mutual benefit’ (Putnam 
cited in Rose, 1998: 8) conflates cause and effect (Rose, 1998: 8 Fn. 1).  But for 
both scholars, social capital spills over from one domain to the next, and for 
Putnam spills upward to make institutions work (Putnam, 1993).  Thus, our data 
should reveal consistencies in social network use across domains, and differ 
mainly by differing levels of interpersonal trust (or differing levels of 
membership or activity in civil society organisations).  Finally, Joseph Coleman 
(1990) places social capital in a political economy (rather than social 
psychological) framework.  Social capital consists of networks (rather than 
norms); it is a way of ‘getting things done’ that is situational and instrumental.  
Thus, if true, the data should reveal survival strategy patterns that differ 
principally by domain, as well as by differences in individual need. 
 
In order to test these hypotheses, it necessary to determine whether there are 
underlying patterns that enable us to reduce people’s survival strategies to 
broader summary indicators.  We ask the following questions.  Firstly, are there 
coherent patterns of network use across all situations, or domains?  In other 
words, are some strategies consistently used on their own or in conjunction with 
other regardless of the situation?  For example, do those who rely on friends and 
neighbours also tend to rely on social cooperation?  On the other hand, do those 
who use market strategies tend not to look to the state?  Secondly, are there 
coherent patterns of network use within domains?  In other words, if people may 
alter their strategies across domains, do they tend to use specific strategies on 
their own or in conjunction with each other within a survival domain?   
 
The answer to both questions is a clear ‘no’.  Looking across all strategies 
(primary and backup) and across all domains, it is impossible to extract anything 
resembling a valid or reliable single or set of summary indicators.36  The same is 
                                                     
36  Across all strategies and situations, Factor Analysis 13 factors with an Eigenvalue 
greater than 1.00, with no single factor accounting for more than 5 percent of total variance. 
70 
true if we only look at primary strategies37 or backup strategies,38 or within 
specific domains.  What this means is that there is no single or set of strategies 
that are consistently employed across all domains.    
 
At most, we could identify three valid (though not necessarily reliable) two-item 
indicators that measure the extent to which people pursue three specific primary 
strategies to obtain food and cash income: the first measures the degree to which 
people rely on the market to obtain food and cash;39 the second assesses the 
extent to which people rely on their own initiative;40 and the third taps the extent 
to which they utilize family and friends.41  However, it is possible to create a 
valid and reliable scale that measures helplessness (the extent to which people 
have no primary strategies) across all four domains,42 as well as one that 
assesses vulnerability (the extent to which people have no backup strategies) 
across the four domains.43  We then regress these strategy specific constructs on 
the same set of variables we used to explain poverty, also adding individual 
scores on the Lived Poverty Index, as well as measures of interpersonal trust44 
and participation in community organisations into the model (Table 46).45 
                                                     
37  Looking only at primary strategies across all situations, it is not possible to extract 
any single factor on which more than 3 items load at > .20.  
38  Looking only at backup strategies across all situations, Factor Analysis was unable 
to produce a solution.  
39  Dummy variables measuring use of the market for food and cash correlate with 
each other at r = .32 with a reliability of Alpha = .52 (n=8185).  
40  Dummy variables measuring self-reliance to get food and cash correlate with each 
other at r = .32 with a reliability of Alpha = .49 (n=8185).  
41  Dummy variables measuring use of family and friends for food and cash correlate 
with other at r = .46 and reliability of Alpha = .63 (n=8185).  Using all four responses across 
all domains, it is possible to extract a single unrotated factor with an Eigenvalue of 1.52 that 
explains 38.1 percent of the common variance of all four items.  However, reliability (Alpha) 
is .46.  The dummy variables measuring the use of family and friends for home security and 
provide for health care load with the overall item at only .16 and .10 respectively. 
42  Using all four dummy variables, it is possible to extract a single common factor 
with an Eigenvalue of 1.28 that measures 32 percent of the common variance, but with a very 
low reliability (Alpha = .22) (n=8185).  The variables load on the common factor as follows: 
cash (.36), health care (.32), food (.31) and home security (.24). 
43  Using all four dummy variables, it is possible to extract a single common factor 
with an Eigenvalue of 1.88 that explains 46.9 percent of the common variance, with a 
reliability of Alpha = .62 (n=8185).  The variables load on the common factor as follows: cash 
(.69), food (.61), health care (.47) and home security (.39). 
44   As measured by an item that asked: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ 
45  The root of the question read: ‘In the last twelve months, how often have you 
attended meetings of a ____: Never, Just once or twice, A few times, or Often?’  An average 
index measuring ‘Community Organization Participation’ was created from responses to the 
following items: ‘Church group (other than religious services,’ ‘Local self-help association 
(such as stokvel, burial association or neighbourhood watch,’ ‘Group concerned with local 
matter such as schools, housing or rates,’ ‘Local commercial organization such as business 
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The results appear to lend strong support to both the Coleman and Fukuyama 
approaches.   In support of the Coleman thesis that social capital is situational 
and context specific, we begin by noting the fact that the most frequently 
employed strategies differed across three of the four situations.  We also point to 
the strong impact of (un)employment and occupational class on market and 
family and friends’ strategies, and the fact that the probability of turning to self-
reliance increases substantially in areas that lack development infrastructure or 
widespread community services.  In other words, people seem to adopt 
strategies that fit their situations.    
 
Secondly, in support of the Fukuyama argument, there are clear and consistent 
differences by national citizenship in the degree to which people use the market, 
rely on friends and families, and depend on self-reliance to obtain food and 
income, as well as in the degree to which they are helpless or vulnerable in all 
four domains.  At equal levels of education, need, and interpersonal trust, people 
who live in the other five countries are significantly more likely than South 
Africans (the reference group) to use the market, and less likely to rely on 
friends and family to get food and cash.  With the exception of Batswana, they 
are also more likely to look to self-reliance.  That there are opposite signs on the 
coefficients for helplessness between Malawi and Lesotho indicates that 
Basotho are more likely to have no survival strategies or networks than 
Malawians and helps illuminate why the Lived Poverty Index find so much 
more destitution in Lesotho, even though it has significantly higher levels of 
GNP per capita than Malawi.  
 
Thirdly, in contrast to the Inglehart thesis, people who are trusting of others are 
no more likely to make use of the market, rely on friends and family or practice 
self-reliance to obtain food and cash (though there is a slight tendency for them 
to be less likely to be helpless or vulnerable).  Membership or attendance in 
local community organisations also fails to yield the anticipated results.  In fact, 
those who are more active in local groups are actually more likely to depend on 
self-reliance and be vulnerable, and less likely to rely on friends and family for 
help.  Thus, at least as measured here, participation in social survival networks 
seems to rely much more on factors related to the structure of the political 
economy and far less on social psychological factors. 
                                                                                                                                                                      




Table 46: Explaining Choice of Survival Strategies 
Uses the Market 
As Primary 
Strategy to 
Obtain Food  & 
Cash 
Relies on Family 
& Friends As 
Primary Strategy 
to Obtain Food & 
Cash 
Relies on Self 
Help As Primary 
Strategy to 














Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta 
Age  .00 -.10*** .05*** .02 .07*** 
Gender (Male) .02 -.09*** .02* -.04** -.02 
Location (Urban)  .08*** .00 -.14*** -.00 .00 
Education  -.02 .06*** -.03* -.04** -.05*** 
Employment .30*** -.22*** -.06*** -.03 -.07*** 
Unemployed in 
past 12 months  
-.05*** .04*** .01 
 
-.01 -.06*** 
Middle Class .11*** -.13*** .01 -.04* -.05*** 
Working Class .21*** -.15*** -.02 -.03 -.01 
Subsistence 
Farmer 
.03* -.08*** .12*** -.04** -.03** 
Never Had A Job -.06*** .01 .01 .05*** .01 
Development 
Infrastructure 
.01 .09*** -.20*** .01 .01 
Community 
Services 
-.01 .01 -.05*** .01 .00 
Agricultural 
Activity  
.03 -.01 .02 -.03 .00 
Access to Schools .01 .01 .04*** -.05*** .02 
Interpersonal 
Trust 




.01 -.04*** .08*** -.00 .06*** 
Asian  -.01 -.01 .02* -.05*** -.04*** 
Coloured -.02 -.03** .03*** -.04** -.06*** 
White  .04** -.09*** .06*** -.04** -.06*** 
Batswana  .08*** -.12*** .03** .15*** .16*** 
Basotho  .18*** -.26*** .20*** .19*** .50*** 
Malawi an  .19*** -.34*** .38*** -.06** .34*** 
Zambian  .11*** -.29*** .21*** .04* .28*** 
Zimbabwean .08*** -.21*** .22*** -.00 .37*** 
N 6373 6373 6373 6373 6373 
Standard Error .3305 .3404 .2315 .1312 .2759 
R Squared .24 .28 .46 .10 .33 
* sig = .05,  
** sig = .01,  
*** sig = .001 
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The Extent of Social Capital 
 
Beside the question of the kinds or types of strategies and networks people 
employ in order to survive, a second important question has to do with the extent 
or breadth of their survival repertoire.  In an uncertain society where formal 
institutions do not work well, one might expect people to build into their 
survival strategies a degree of redundancy (Rose, 1998: 19-20). Redundancy 
might be accomplished by either actively using multiple strategies or networks, 
or by having one or several backup strategies in case of failure of an existing 
strategy.   
 
However, the data suggest that the survival repertoire of Southern Africans is 
quite limited (Table 47).  The median respondent uses only one strategy to 
obtain food in five countries; only in Malawi does the average person use two 
strategies (though a substantial number also pursue a second strategy in 
Lesotho).   Echoing our earlier discussion, the average Basotho, Zambian and 
Zimbabwean has no backup method to obtain food, as is also true for almost half 
of Malawians.   The average Basotho has no method for protecting his own 
home, while the media respondent elsewhere uses just one strategy.   With the 
exception of South Africa, the median person across the region has no strategy 
in reserve.   With a few exceptions, the same depressing picture repeats itself 
with regard to cash income and health care. 
 
Table 47: Extent of Social Capital within Each Domain  
 
 Botswana Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe Lesotho South Africa 
Primary Food Strategies 
0 1 <1 2 2 <1 0 
1 70 47 65 58 50 61 
2 25 43 28 34 47 30 
3 4 9 5 5 3 7 
4 1 1 <1 1 0 2 
Backup Food Strategies 
0 7 47 58 51 70 12 
1 85 46 38 43 28 64 
2 7 7 4 5 2 19 
3 1 <1 <1 1 <1 5 
Primary Home Security Strategies 
0 40 10 44 16 54 14 
1 49 49 37 47 31 37 
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Table 47 continued.. 
 
 Botswana Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe Lesotho South Africa 
Primary Home Security Strategies 
2 10 34 15 28 14 32 
3 2 6 3 7 2 13 
4 <1 1 1 2 <1 4 
Backup Home Security Strategies 
0 67 57 74 65 82 28 
1 30 34 22 31 17 53 
2 3 8 4 4 1 15 
3 <1 1 <1 <1 <1 4 
Primary Cash Strategies 
0 4 1 5 8 10 5 
1 71 59 64 65 66 72 
2 20 34 25 24 21 19 
3 4 5 6 3 4 3 
4 1 1 <1 <1% <1 1 
Backup Cash Strategies 
0 47 47 63 61 66 20 
1 48 44 33 37 32 66 
2 5 7 3 2 2 12 
3 1 2 <1 <1 <1 2 
Primary Health Care Strategies 
0 2 1 3 5 4 1 
1 52 33 62 62 50 49 
2 36 50 28 24 40 32 
3 9 14 7 8 5 13 
4 1 1 <1 2 <1 5 
Backup Health Care Strategies 
0 48 51 58 53 69 19 
1 47 44 39 40 30 62 
2 5 5 3 6 1 15 
3 <1 <1 <1 1 <1 4 
 
An alternative way to examine this question is simply to sum all employed 
strategies/networks across all domains (Table 48).   Malawians (6.3) and South 
Africans (6.0) employ the highest average number of strategies in order to 
survive across the four domains and Basotho (4.8) the lowest.  South Africans 
(4.1) can also point to the highest average number of back-up strategies, and 
Basotho (1.2) the lowest (Table 49). 
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Table 48: Extent of Social Capital (Total Number of Primary Strategies) 
Across Domains 
 
 Botswana Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe Lesotho South Africa 
0 <1 0 1 1 0 0 
1 <1 0 <1 1 1 0 
2 2 <1 4 2 4 1 
3 17 5 25 9 15 7 
4 30 15 23 24 26 19 
5 22 17 13 22 25 22 
6 14 21 14 17 17 18 
7 8 17 11 11 8 13 
8 4 12 6 6 4 9 
9 2 7 3 4 1 4 
10 1 3 1 1 <1 3 
11 <1 2 <1 1 0 2 
12 <1 1 <1 1 0 1 
13 0 1 0 1 0 1 
14 0 <1 0 <1 0 1 
15 0 0 0 <1 0 <1 
16 0 0 0 0 0 <1 
Mean 4.9 6.3 4.9 5.4 4.8 6.0 
 
What explains the extent of people’s survival repertoires?  Are there any 
predictable differences between those people with broader or narrower survival 
repertoires?  We regressed the two summary measures of the extent/breadth of 
existing and backup strategies on the same set of predictor variables used in the 
previous analysis.  The results yield the same broad conclusions (Table 50). 
 
There is some increased evidence for the Inglehart thesis.  Membership and 
attendance in local community organisations is positively associated with the 
extent of both existing and backup strategies, but interpersonal trust is weakly 
and inconsistently so.  The Coleman argument finds less support.  Those people 
who are presumably in greatest need of a wider portfolio of options actually 
have less); the hard core unemployed have fewer existing strategies, and 
educated, urbanized, and employed people have more backup strategies.   
Ultimately, it is the Fukuyama type of argument about national differences that 
appears to find the greatest support.  The best predictor of the extent of survival 




Table 49: Extent of Social Capital (Total Number of Backup Strategies) 
Across Domains 
 
 Botswana Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe Lesotho South 
Africa 
0 2 25 30 21 34 3 
1 22 13 23 23 31 5 
2 27 13 20 23 20 9 
3 26 22 14 17 10 18 
4 15 17 8 12 4 31 
5 6 5 3 4 1 17 
6 1 4 1 1 <1 9 
7 1 1 1 1 0 4 
8 <1 <1 <1 <1 0 3 
9 0 0 <1 0 0 1 
10 0 <1 0 0 0 1 
11 0 0 0 0 0 <1 
12 0 0 0 0 0 <1 
Mean 2.5 2.3 1.6 1.9 1.2 4.1 
 
 
Table 50: Explaining Extent of Survival Strategies 
 
Extent of Existing Strategies Extent of Backup Strategies  
B Beta B Beta 
(Constant) 5.445  3.583  
Age  -. 002 -.01 - .007     -.05*** 
Gender (Male) - .081 -.02   .068  .02 
Location (Urban) - .038 -.01   .155    .04* 
Education   .023  .02   .064       .05*** 
Employment  .039  .02   .124       .05*** 
Unemployed in past 
12 months  
- .037 -.01   .100   .03* 
Middle Class  .162  .03   .218     .04** 
Working Class  .128  .03   .027  .01 
Subsistence Farmer  .243   .04*   .296       .04*** 
Never Had A Job - .355     -.06*** -. 154   -.03* 
Development 
Infrastructure 
- .048 -.01 - .029 -.01 
Community Services -.067 -.01 - .024 -.00 
Agricultural Activity  .274     .05**   .067  .01 
Access to Schools  .313       .04*** - .012 -.00 
Interpersonal Trust -.126   -.03*   .155     .03** 
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Table 50 continued… 
 
Extent of Existing Strategies Extent of Backup Strategies  




 .143       .05*** - .121      -.04*** 
Asian  -1.245       -.07***   .029  .00 
Coloured -. 614       -.05***   .061  .01 
White  - .209 -.02   .099  .01 
Batswana  -1.242     -.21*** -1.562      -.27*** 
Basotho  -1.370     -.25*** -2.732     -.51*** 
Malawian  - .067 -.01 -1.824      -.34*** 
Zambian  -1.505      -.25*** -2.499     -.42*** 
Zimbabwean - .726     -.12*** -2.083      -.35*** 
N 6373  6373  
Standard Error 1.9345  1.6286  
R Squared .10  .32  
* sig = .05 
** sig = .01 
*** sig = .001 
 
The Impact of Social Capital on Lived Poverty 
 
Finally, we enquire as to whether social capital is able to cushion people who 
might otherwise be seen as poor against the daily experiences of lived poverty 
and destitution.   In order to ensure that we assess the impact of all relevant 
survival strategies in our data, we use the summary indicators of food and cash 
strategies discussed above but also include the most frequently used primary 
strategies for home security and health care, as well the single summary 
indicator of absence of primary strategies (helplessness) and the extent of 
individual backup strategies across all domains (Table 51).   
 
Holding all else equal, three specific strategies appear to have an independent 
effect in reducing the experience of lived poverty.   Those who rely on 
themselves to secure food or health care, and those who are able to use the 
market to meet their health-care needs, experience significantly lower degrees of 
lived poverty.  On the other hand, the extent to which one is without a primary 
survival strategy across the four domains significantly increases lived poverty.  
Finally, the wider the extent of one’s backup strategies, the lower the level of 
lived poverty.  
 
Two other variables relevant to social capital display significant relationships 
with lived poverty.  The more one trusts other people, the lower their level of 
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lived poverty (though the impact is relatively small).  Membership or attendance 
in local organisations is also related to poverty; however, the direction of the 
impact is in precisely the opposite direction to that which might be expected.  
Net all other effects, those who are most active in civil society experience higher 
levels of everyday poverty.  
 
Table 51: Impact of Social Capital on Lived Poverty  
 
 B Beta B Beta 
(Constant) 3.217  3.434  
Age  .002       .05***  .002     .03** 
Gender (Male) .036    .02*  .036    .02* 
Location (Urban) -.019 -.01 -.029 -.02 
Education  -.062     -.13*** -.058     -.12*** 
Employment -.012 -.01 -.015 -.02 
Unemployed in past 12 
months  
.111       .07***  .106       .07*** 
Middle Class -.051 -.02 -.030 -.01 
Working Class -.000  .00  .010  .01 
Subsistence Farmer -.038 -.02  .012  .00 
Never Had A Job .059   .03*  .045  .02 
Development 
Infrastructure 
-.630     -.28*** -.651       -.29*** 
Community Services .207       .07***  .185       .06*** 
Agricultural Activity  .035  .02  .047  .02 
Access to Schools -.218     -.08*** -.212     -.08*** 
Asian  -.714     -.11*** -.661     -.11*** 
Coloured -.503     -.12*** -.470     -.11*** 
White  -.487     -.14*** -.426    -.12*** 
Batswana  -.274     -.13*** -.372     -.17*** 
Basotho  .140       .07***  .046  .02 
Malawian  -.030 -.02  .001  .00 
Zambian  .253       .11***  .193       .08*** 
Zimbabwean .193        .08***  .179       .08*** 
Interpersonal Trust   -.054    -.03** 
Community Organization 
Participation 
   .072       .06*** 
Markets Strategy for Food 
and Cash 
  -.036 -.02 
Family & Friends Strategy 
for Food and Cash 
  -.043 -.02 
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Table 51 continued… 
 
 B Beta B Beta 
Self Reliant Strategy for 
Food and Cash 
  -.251     -.10*** 
Self Reliant Strategy for 
Home Security 
  -.038 -.03 
Social Cooperation 
Strategy for Home 
Security  
  -.003 -.00 
State Strategy for Health 
Care 
   .003  .00 
Market Strategy for Health 
Care 
  -.093     -.06*** 
Traditional Healer 
Strategy for Health Care 
  -.000  .00 
Self Reliant Strategy for 
Health Care 
  -.106    -.04*** 
Helpless    .353    .06*** 
Extent of Backup 
Strategies 
  -.026    -.07*** 
N 6477  6071  
Standard Error .6165  .6042  
R Squared .34  .37  
* sig = .05,  
** sig = .01,  
*** sig = .001 
 
The Political Consequences of Poverty 
 
We began this paper by noting that the link between national wealth (or, 
inversely, poverty) and sustainable democracy is one of clearest and most 
consistent findings of empirical political science (Lipset, 1959; Bollen and 
Jackman, 1989; Przewroski et al, 2000).  However, we also noted that the 
precise reasons behind this relationship have not been so obvious.  Most 
importantly, we have not yet determined conclusively whether the linkage 
between development and democracy is a micro-level phenomenon that occurs 
because the poor are differentially ‘democratic’ compared to the relatively 
wealthy (Inglehart, 2000; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Welzel et al, n.d.), or 
whether it is a macro-level dynamic with its roots in the greater abilities of 
wealthy societies to sustain democratic institutions and procedures (Huntington, 
1991).  
 
In this final section, we investigate the micro-level consequences of lived 
poverty.  That is, independently of its correlates such as lower levels of 
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education, rural location, unemployment and ill health, does lived poverty affect 
political behaviour and political attitudes?  The conventional wisdom implies 
that poverty decreases both participation in democratic life and popular support 
for democracy.  Poorer people may have less time to devote to the types of 
participation that give life to democracy, independent of the fact they tend to be 
less educated and more rural.  They may also have less reason to participate 
because they have less investment in a society in which they have not done as 
well as others.  Their station in life may also demotivate people by reducing 
their belief in their ability to bring about political change.  Given the imperative 
to satisfy basic survival needs, poor people may have little reason to worry about 
satisfying supposedly ‘higher order’ needs like self-government, the freedom 
and equality that democracy fulfils?  On the other hand, is also possible that, 
independently of correlates such as lower levels of education, poverty may 
provide people with greater incentives to mobilize politically in order to demand 
economic redress. 
 
Part of the reason that this issue has never been resolved is the lack of valid and 
reliable individual measures of poverty in politically oriented survey data, as 
distinct from household income (which often contains a great deal of missing or 
unreliable data because space and time limitations mean it is usually measured 
with a single question).   Thus, much of what we know about the democratic 
correlates of wealth and poverty comes from country level correlations drawn 
from aggregate data.  And much of the current wisdom about the political 
impacts of individual or household poverty is based on qualitative data that is 
not necessarily representative of whole societies.  Rather than strategically 
include measures of political participation in household income and expenditure 
surveys, the World Bank chose to sponsor 81 focus group based ‘Participatory 
Poverty Assessments’ in 50 countries, 28 of these in Africa.  These PPAs were 
intended to be a qualitative complement to the Bank’s quantitative Living 
Standards Surveys Measures (Narrayan, 2000).  This stems from the tendency 
discussed earlier for economists to presume that quantitative data can only 
capture concrete things such as assets and consumer behaviour, whereas their 
attitudes about economics and politics can only be assessed through qualitative 
measures.46 
Analyses of these PPAs concluded that poor people’s experiences of poverty 
include a dimension of powerlessness.  This is characterised by a dependency on 
                                                     
46  For example, even as they set out to review a relatively comprehensive set of 
quantitative indicators of poverty and development in South Africa, development analysts 
Ingrid Woolard and Conrad Barberton argue (Woolard and Barberton in Barberton et al, 
1998: 13-14) that: ‘quantitative data fails to fully capture the qualitative aspects of inequality 
and poverty as people experience it day by day.’  Astonishingly, they undercut much of the 
impact of their analysis by conceding that ‘We do not presume that this article captures what 
it really means to be poor.’   
81 
others, and a lack of voice and options.  More precisely, analysts concluded that 
poor people lack information about, and access to, government (especially the 
police and courts) and that they see the state as ineffective, irrelevant and 
corrupt.  They are regularly victimised by public officials and encounter 
increasing levels of crime.  As a consequence, they are forced to rely on 
informal networks and associations in order to get by (Narrayan, 2000).  
However, Ravi Kunbar and Lyn Squire (1999:22) have noted that the qualitative 
and focussed nature of these studies means that ‘we do not have household-level 
measures of vulnerability and powerlessness and so cannot distinguish the poor 
(in these dimensions) from the non-poor’.  Yet this is precisely what the 
Afrobarometer data allow us to do. 
 
We attempt to assess these questions by linking our measure of lived poverty 
with a range of possible political outcomes.  First of all, we examine the 
correlation between poverty and various measures of political awareness: 
interest in politics,47 television and newspaper use,48 and political efficacy 
(Table 52).49  In doing so, we statistically control for the impact of other factors 
which are themselves related to poverty and may have independent impact on 
the phenomena in question (such as education, ill health, rural-urban location, 
and employment status).  Net of these factors, we see that poverty not only fails 
to decrease respondent’s interest in politics, but is associated with a slight 
increase.  However, poverty does appear to reduce people’s exposure to news 
media through television and newspapers, and also slightly reduces people’s 
sense of political efficacy. 
 
                                                     
47  As measured by an index of two items:  1. ‘When you get together with your 
friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?’  2.  
‘Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the 
time, whether there’s an election going on or not.  Others aren’t that interested.  Would you 
say you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of 
the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?’ 
48  As measured by an average index of Reponses to two items:  ‘How often do you 
get news from (1) television (2) newspapers: every day, a few times a week, a few times a 
month, less than once a month, never?’ 
49  As measured by an average index combining responses to three items:  1. ‘You 
think that you do not have enough information about political life and the actions of 
government.’  2.  ‘Sometimes political and government affairs seem so complicated that you 
can’t really understand what’s going on.’  3.  ‘In this country, you must be very careful of 
what you say about politics.’  Responses were Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor 
disagree, Disagree and Strongly disagree. 
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Table 52: Linkages of Poverty and Political Awareness 
 
 Poverty Poverty 
(Controlling for Education, Ill-Health, 
Rural-Urban Location Employment) 
Interest in Politics -.01 .05*** 
TV / Newspaper Use -.43*** -.22*** 
Political Efficacy -.14*** -.06*** 
 N=7802 N=7412 
* sig = .05 
** sig = .01 
*** sig = .001 
 
We then examine whether poverty shapes key political values of interpersonal 
trust.  Interpersonal trust has been argued to be a key predictor of political 
participation and effective political institutions (Putnam, 1993).  We also test 
whether poverty shapes the way people understand democracy.50  Are poor 
people more likely to view democracy as a way to effect substantive outcomes 
than as a set of political procedures to make decisions?  In order to ensure we 
isolate the effect of poverty, we add the measures of political awareness 
examined above to our list of controls (Table 53).  Net these effects, we see that 
poverty reduces levels of interpersonal trust very slightly, and has no effect on 
the extent to which people define democracy as a set of political procedures.  
However, increased poverty is associated with a slightly greater propensity to 
define democracy as a set of substantive outcomes.   
 
So far, we have seen at best faint support for the conventional wisdom.  When 
we turn to examine the linkages of poverty and political participation, the 
common wisdom is turned on its head (Table 54).  Net the impact of correlates 
such as education, ill health or political awareness, the most impoverished 
respondents are as likely as the least impoverished to have voted in their most 
recent national election,51 or taken part in political protest.52   
                                                     
50  The root of the question read: ‘People associate democracy with many diverse 
meanings such as the ones I will mention now.  In order for a society to be called democratic, 
is each of these things: absolutely essential, important, not very important, or not important at 
all?’  One average index measuring ‘Political Understandings of Democracy’ is created by 
responses to the following items: ‘majority rule,’ ‘complete freedom for anyone to criticise 
government,’ ‘regular elections,’ ‘at least two political parties competing with each other.’  
Another index measuring ‘Economic Understandings of Democracy’ is created by responses 
to these items: ‘basic necessities like shelter, food and water for everyone,’ ‘jobs for 
everyone,’ ‘equality in education,’ and ‘a small income gap between rich and poor.’  
51  As measured by a single item: ‘With regard to the most recent, INSERT YEAR, 
national elections, which statement is true for you?  I decided not to vote, I was not able to 
vote, I voted in the elections, Election not held in my area?’ 
52  The root of the question read: ‘Here are a number of different actions people might 
take if government were to do something they thought was wrong or harmful.  For each of 
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Table 53: Linkages of Poverty and Political Values 
 
 Poverty Poverty 
(Controlling for Education, Ill-Health, Rural-
Urban Location, Employment, Political 
Interest, Media Use, Political Efficacy) 
Interpersonal Trust .01 -.03*** 
Political Understanding of 
Democracy 
-.01 .01 
Economic Understanding of 
Democracy 
.07*** .06*** 
 N=6460 N=5659 
* sig = .05 
** sig = .01 
*** sig = .001 
 
More importantly, those who suffer frequent shortages of basic necessities are 
actually more likely to attend meetings of community organisations,53 contact 
political leaders,54 participate in conventional political processes,55 or comply 
with the law.56  It is true, however, that the poor are more likely to be the victims 
                                                                                                                                                                      
these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or not:  Yes-often, Yes-a few 
times, Yes-once or twice, No-but would do it if had the chance, No-would never do it?’  One 
average index measuring ‘Political Protest Participation’ is created by the responses to the 
following item: ‘Attend a demonstration or protest march,’ ‘Participate in a boycott of rates, 
services or taxes,’ ‘Take part in a sit-in, disruption of government meeting or offices,’ and 
‘Use force or violent methods (such as damaging public property).’  
53   This is the average index on Community Organization Participation described in 
Endnote 97.   
54  As measured by a single item: ‘In the past year, have you contacted a government 
or political party official about some important problem or to give them your views?  IF YES: 
Was it just once or twice, a few times, or frequently?’  
55   The root of the question read: ‘Here is a list of things that people sometimes do as 
citizens.  For each of these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or not:  
Often, A few times, Once or twice, No-but would do it if had the chance, No-would never do 
this?’  An average index measuring ‘Procedural Participation’ was created from the responses 
to the following items: ‘Participate with others to address and important problem affecting the 
community or nation (other than an election),’ ‘Attend an election rally,’ ‘Work for a political 
candidate or party,’ and ‘Write a letter to a newspaper.’  
56  The root of the question read: ‘We would like to remind you that your responses to 
this interview are confidential.  Here is a list of actions ordinary people are taking in a 
political system.  For each of these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity 
or not:  Yes-often, Yes-a few times, Yes-once or twice, No, but would do it if had the chance, 
No-would never do this.’   An average index measuring ‘Compliance With the Law’ was 
created from the responses to the following items: ‘Claim government benefits to which you 
are not entitled (like a pension, maintenance, or unemployment payment,’ ‘Avoid paying 
municipal / local rates,’ ‘Avoid paying income taxes,’ ‘Get services like electricity or water 
without paying for them.’  
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of abuse or extortion from government leaders who demand payments or 
favours in return for delivering services,57 but the differences are very slight.  
 
Table 54:  Linkages of Poverty and Political Participation 
 
 Poverty Poverty 
(Controlling for Education, Ill-Health, Rural-
Urban Location, Employment, Political 
Interest, Media Use, Political Efficacy, 
Interpersonal Trust) 
Community Participation .12*** .11*** 
Contact Leaders .12*** .08*** 
Vote In Most Recent 
Election 
.02 .01 




Compliance With the Law .14*** .13*** 
Victimisation by Corruption  .03* .07*** 
 N=-5789 N=4936 
* sig = .05 
** sig = .01 
*** sig = .001 
 
Next we test whether poverty shapes citizens’ policy preferences (Table 55).  
We examine responses to an open-ended question that asked people ‘What are 
the most important problems facing the country that government should 
address?’  In order to facilitate a simple comparison we take the Afrobarometer 
poverty index and divide respondents into poor and not poor using 2.5 on a scale 
of 1 to 4 as the dividing point.  
   
While there are some differences in policy preferences, they are not large.  Poor 
respondents are twice as likely (12 percent) as non-poor (6 percent) to list 
problems around food as an important national problem requiring government 
attention.  Approximately the same difference is also found with regard to water 
where 9 percent of the poor cite this problem compared to 5 percent of the non-
poor.  While they are also more likely to cite problems around farming, 
transportation, the national economy, health and health care and poverty, the 
                                                     
57   The root of the question read: ‘In the past year, have you or anyone in your family 
had to pay money to government officials (beside paying rates or taxes), give them a gift, or 
do them a favour, in order to get the following; No, Once or twice, A few times, Often?’  An 
average index measuring ‘Victimization by Corruption’ was created from the responses to the 
following items: ‘A job,’ ‘A government maintenance payment, pension payment or loan,’ 
‘Electricity or water,’ or ‘Housing or land.’   
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difference is no more than four percentage points across any of these items.  The 
non-poor are about twice as likely to call for government emphasis on fighting 
HIV/ AIDS (11 percent) as the poor (5 percent), and one third more likely to cite 
crime (30 percent) as the poor (20 percent).  They are also more likely to cite job 
creation, education, housing and corruption as areas needing government 
intervention, but the greatest difference on these issues is no more than seven 
percentage points. 
 
Table 55: Policy Priorities of the Poor 
 
 Not Poor Poor 
Issues of Greater Concern to Poor Respondents 
Economy 21 24 
Health  18 20 
Food 6 12 
Poverty / Destitution 11 12 
Farming 7 11 
Transport 7 10 
Water 5 9 
General Services 5 7 
Issues of Greater Concern to Non-Poor Respondents 
Jobs 54 47 
Crime 30 20 
Education 20 16 
AIDS 11 5 
Housing 9 6 
Corruption 6 3 
Issues Where There Is No Difference 
Welfare 4 4 
Discrimination / Equality 3 2 
Electricity 2 2 
Wages 2 2 
Traditional/Moral Values 2 2 
Governance  2 2 
N = 8626   
 
Finally, we test whether poverty reduces support for liberal economic and 
democratic political regimes (Table 56).  We find that poverty has no impact on 
the extent to which people see democracy as the only acceptable form of 
government,58 though it does - net all other influences - reduce the extent to 
                                                     
58   As measured by the single item: ‘With which of these statements are you most in 
agreement, A, B or C:  A. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government?  B. In 
some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable to democratic 
government.   C. For someone like me, a democratic or non democratic regime makes no 
difference?’  
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which people reject non-democratic alternatives to their present multi-party 
regime.59  In contrast to support for political regimes, poverty appears to have a 
much stronger impact on support for economic regimes.  Poverty sharply 
reduces support for economic adjustment.60  
 
Table 56: Linkages of Poverty and Support for Regime Change 
 
 Poverty Poverty 
(Controlling for Education, Ill-Health, 
Rural-Urban, Employment, Political Interest, 
Media Use, Political Efficacy, Interpersonal 
Trust) 
Reject Non- Democratic 
Alternatives 
-.09*** -.05*** 




 N=-5934 N=5163 
* sig = .05 
** sig = .01 
*** sig = .001 
 
                                                     
59  The root of the question reads: ‘Our current system of governing with regular 
elections and more than one political party is not the only one ____ has ever had.  Some 
people say that we would be better off if we had a different system of government.  How 
much would you disapprove, neither disapprove or approve of the following alternatives to 
our current system of government with at least two political parties and regular election: 
Strongly disapprove, Disapprove, Neither approve nor disapprove, Approve, Strongly 
approve?’  An average index measuring ‘Rejection of Non-Democratic Alternatives’ was 
created from responses to the following items: ‘If only one political party, or candidates from 
only one party, were allowed to stand for elections and hold office,’ ‘If all decisions were 
made by a council of elders, traditional leaders or chiefs?’ ‘If the army came in to govern the 
country,’ ‘If parliament and political parties were abolished, so that the President could decide 
everything,’ ‘If the country returned to the old system we had under [former authoritarian 
regime].’ 
60  An additive index measuring ‘Support for Economic Adjustment’ was created that 
counts agreement with the following statements: (1) ‘It is better to have a wide variety of 
goods and many goods in the market, even if prices are high’ (rather than ‘It is better to have 
low prices, even if there are shortages of goods’); (2) ‘It is better to be able to raise health care 
standards, even if we have to pay medical fees’ (rather than ‘It is better to be able to visit 
clinics and get medicine for free, even if means we cannot raise health care standards’); (3) 
‘The government cannot afford so many public employees and should lay off / retrench some 
of them’ (rather than ‘The number of people who work for government should be reduced, 
even if paying their salaries is costly to the country’); and (4) ‘It is better for the government 
to sell its businesses to private companies and individuals’ (rather than ‘The government 
should retain ownership of its factories, businesses and farms’). 
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Thus, while social scientists have consistently found strong aggregate 
correlations between indicators of national wealth and democratic endurance, we 
are not able to find any important linkages between individual lived poverty and 
citizen behaviours and preferences that are key to the health of democracy.  To 
the extent that these findings from seven southern African countries could be 
replicated elsewhere, this suggests that the key dynamics behind the link 
between democracy and wealth occur at a macro level: that is, rather than poor 
citizens who are less democratic in thought and deed, it simply may be that poor 
countries are less able to afford or maintain the things vital for sustainable 
democracy, ranging from formal state institutions such as quality electoral 
machinery and a well-resourced legislature, to societal institutions such as a 
effective political parties, an independent news media, and a vibrant web of civil 
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